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Emotional public events, relative to non-emotional ones, are typically remembered 
more accurately, more vividly and with more confidence. However, the majority of previous 
studies investigating this have focused on negative public events and less is known about 
positive ones. The current study examined whether positive and negative public events were 
remembered in a similar manner by assessing individuals’ memory for the time when they 
learned the results of the UK’s 2016 Referendum on its European Union (EU) membership. 
Participants included UK participants who voted to ‘leave’ the EU in the referendum and 
found the event highly positive, UK participants who voted to ‘remain’ in the EU and found 
the event highly negative, and US participants who did not vote and found the event neutral. 
Data from a total of 851 participants were assessed at four time points over the course of 16 
months. Growth curve modelling showed that differences in memory between participants in 
the Remain group (who reported the highest levels of negative emotion) and those in the 
Leave group (who reported the highest levels of positive emotion) emerged over time. 
Specifically, Remain participants maintained higher levels of memory consistency than 
Leave participants, while Leave participants maintained higher levels of memory confidence 
than Remain participants. These results indicate that positive and negative public events are 
remembered differently, such that negative valence enhances memory accuracy, while 
positive valence results in overconfidence.  
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Emotional items and events are typically remembered better than non-emotional items 
and events (for reviews see LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Talmi, 2013) and are often preserved in 
memory for longer, sometimes spanning several years (Dolcos et al., 2005; Levine & 
Edelstein, 2009). In lab-based settings, this emotion advantage is evident across a range of 
different stimuli; including words (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; LaBar & Phelps, 1998), pictures 
(Dolcos et al., 2004; Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002; Nashiro et al., 2012; Ochsner, 2000; Sakaki et 
al., 2019) and film clips (Cahill et al., 1996). Emotional stimuli are also often remembered 
more vividly and with more confidence than neutral stimuli (Cooper et al., 2019; Sharot et 
al., 2004, 2007; Todd et al., 2012).  
Such emotion-induced memory enhancement also extends to real-life 
autobiographical memories (Talarico et al., 2004). One extreme example of such memories 
are flashbulb memories that are typically formed following a surprising and highly emotional 
public event, such as the 9/11 terrorist attack (Curci & Luminet, 2006; Hirst et al., 2009; 
Kvavilashvili et al., 2009) or the deaths of well-known figures (R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; 
Day & Ross, 2014; Hornstein et al., 2003). Despite the wealth of research on emotion and 
memory, however, it has been not clearly understood how similarly positive and negative 
public events are remembered over time. In the current paper, we investigated whether a 
public event that is interpreted as either positive or negative is similarly remembered over 
time by assessing individuals’ memory for the United Kingdom (UK)’s 2016 Referendum on 
their European Union (EU) membership. 
Previous studies on emotion and memory often focused on the effects of emotional 
arousal and suggest that highly arousing emotional stimuli are remembered better than 
neutral stimuli irrespective of emotional valence (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Schümann et al., 




recognition that positive and negative valence can influence our memory in different ways 
(for reviews, see Bowen, Kark & Kensinger, 2018; Kensinger, 2009). For example, negative 
faces and scenes were recalled better than positive faces and scenes even when they were 
matched for arousal (Keightley et al., 2011). Negatively valenced items are also recalled 
more precisely (Spachtholz et al., 2014; Xie & Zhang, 2017) and with a greater sense of 
vividness than neutral and positive stimuli (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 2000; Xie & 
Zhang, 2016). Recent research has also shown that individuals’ abilities to learn associations 
between pairs are impaired by negative emotion but facilitated by positive emotion (Madan et 
al., 2012, 2019). 
These findings are consistent with several theoretical frameworks, such as the affect-
as-information framework (Storbeck & Clore, 2005) and the NEVER (Negative Emotional 
Valence Enhances Recapitulation) Forget model (Bowen et al., 2018). According to the 
affect-as-information theory, positive emotion is thought to broaden our scope of attention 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) and encourages reliance on general knowledge and scripts 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Consequently, positive emotion helps us concentrate more on the 
global characteristics of the event, meaning we are more likely to remember the overall 
theme or gist (Kensinger, 2009; Levine & Edelstein, 2009). Conversely, when we experience 
negative emotion, we adopt bottom-up processing (Clore et al., 2001) and engage in more 
sensory processes (Mickley & Kensinger, 2008) which enables us to attend to the 
specific/sensory details of the event. The mental representations of these sensory details are 
enhanced and are then more likely to be recapitulated at the time of retrieval. This could in 
turn increase the subjective feelings of vividness in an individual’s memory and improve the 
mnemonic preciseness in the perceptual details associated with negative, rather than positive, 




However, it is not clearly understood whether and how these laboratory findings 
extend to memories for real-life events. In fact, positive autobiographical experiences are 
frequently rated as richer (Ford et al., 2012) and are recalled more frequently (Bohn & 
Berntsen, 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2003; Walker et al., 2003) and with greater sensorial 
detail compared to negative ones (Destun & Kuiper, 1999; A. Schaefer & Philippot, 2005). 
These findings are contrary to the findings of lab-based research and suggest the idea that 
positive emotion may offer a mnemonic advantage over negative emotion. One possible 
explanation about these differences is that lab-based studies significantly differ in their 
methodological approaches to autobiographical memory studies. Notably, autobiographical 
memory studies often focus on what participants remember using a single memory 
assessment, without having an objective measure about what actually happened. This makes 
it difficult to understand how positive and negative valence affects the accuracy or 
consistency of autobiographical memories. 
To address this issue, other studies obtained a baseline measure about what has 
happened to participants (Bohannon, 1988; Hirst et al., 2009; Kraha et al., 2014; 
Kvavilashvili et al., 2009; Talarico & Moore, 2012). One notable example is research on 
flashbulb memories. Flashbulb memories are memories about the personal circumstances in 
which one first learns about a surprising and emotional public event (Conway et al., 1994; 
Hirst et al., 2018), such as the deaths of public figures (Day & Ross, 2014; Demiray & 
Freund, 2015; Tinti et al., 2014), political events (e.g., the fall of the Berlin Wall; Bohn & 
Berntsen, 2007), the resignations of Prime Ministers (e.g. Conway et al., 1994; Stone et al., 
2015), the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Talarico et al., 2019), the inauguration of President 
Obama (Koppel et al., 2013) and sporting events (Breslin & Safer, 2011; Kopietz & 
Echterhoff, 2014; Merck et al., 2020; Talarico & Moore, 2012; Tinti et al., 2014). In research 




public event shortly after it occurred, followed by a subsequent assessment about the same 
memory a few months or years later. This method allows researchers to estimate the accuracy 
of participants’ memories based on how consistent their memories are across the multiple 
assessments (i.e., if their descriptions substantially change between the first vs. subsequent 
assessments, their memories are less likely to be accurate).  
Using such methods, previous research has found that while flashbulb memories are 
susceptible to distortion (Schmolck et al., 2000; Talarico & Rubin, 2003), they are more 
accurate than memories for ordinary events (Christianson, 1989; Conway et al., 1994; Curci 
& Luminet, 2006; Hornstein et al., 2003). Flashbulb memories are also associated with high 
confidence (Hirst et al., 2009; Talarico & Rubin, 2007) and high vividness even after a long 
passage of time (Hirst et al., 2015). These preserved phenomenological features of flashbulb 
memories are revealed to at least partly depend on emotional responses, such as surprise (R. 
Brown & Kulik, 1977; Páez et al., 2018), and emotional intensity (Berntsen & Thomsen, 
2005; Tekcan, 2001), suggesting that emotion has beneficial effects on memory even outside 
of laboratory settings. 
While initial research on flashbulb memories are primarily about negative events, 
more recent research has suggested that individuals can form flashbulb memories even for 
positive public events (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; Kopietz & Echterhoff, 2014; Koppel et 
al., 2013; Kraha et al., 2014). For example, in one study, researchers assessed memories of 
the fall of Berlin’s wall among German citizens who perceived the event as highly positive, 
those who perceived it as neutral, and those who perceived it as highly negative (Bohn & 
Berntsen, 2007). The results indicated that those who perceived the event as positive 
experienced a stronger sense of reliving the event during retrieval than those who perceived 
the event as negative. In another study, older adults were asked to report their memories of 




Denmark: 1) the German occupation of Denmark in 1940 and 2) Denmark’s liberation in 
1945 (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005). Memories for the invasion were remembered less clearly 
than memories for the liberation, suggesting that positive emotion may facilitate the 
formation of flashbulb memories ─ even more than negative emotion. 
To explain these findings, Berntsen proposed the social identity theory of flashbulb 
memories (Berntsen, 2009). The theory is based on the notion our self-concept includes 
social identity which concerns our identifications with the social groups that we perceive 
ourselves as a member of  (Tajfel, 1982). Berntsen expanded this theory and posits that 
individuals form flashbulb memories following a public event when the event is perceived as 
relevant to a social group to which they belong. When an event is perceived to strongly affect 
the day-to-day activities of members of a particular social group, it is more likely to attract 
interest given its perceived importance (Talarico et al., 2019). Consequently, it can lead to 
stronger emotional reactions (positive or negative), increased rehearsal, and result in frequent 
communications within the community, such as television/radio programs of the event or 
conversations about the event with other members in the group (e.g. Day & Ross, 2014), all 
of which can help the long-term maintenance of these memories. In addition, since groups are 
striving to maintain a positive self-image, personal circumstances when hearing positive 
events can be maintained better than personal circumstances when hearing negative public 
events.  
In summary, the social identity theory and laboratory studies suggest different 
predictions about how valence can affect our memories in life. As discussed above, previous 
laboratory studies suggest that negative emotion can lead to more accurate and more vivid 
memories than positive emotion (e.g., Bowen et al., 2018). In contrast, research on 
autobiographical memory and the social identity theory suggests that positive emotion can 




Despite such theoretical predictions, there are still relatively few studies that compare 
memories after a positive versus a negative public event. In addition, those that do make the 
comparison still provide mixed evidence for the effects of valence. For example some studies 
have found that vividness (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; Breslin & Safer, 2011; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2006b), confidence (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Liu et al., 2012; Talarico & Moore, 
2012) and memory consistency (Liu et al., 2012; Talarico & Moore, 2012) are similar for 
both positive and negative events. Meanwhile, there is also evidence that positive and 
negative emotions are differently associated with these measures. For example, some 
researchers have found an association between positive emotion and higher levels of 
confidence (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Kraha et al., 2014), accuracy and/or clarity (Bohn 
& Berntsen, 2007; Breslin & Safer, 2011; Koppel et al., 2013; Levine & Bluck, 2004) and 
vividness (Liu et al., 2012; Talarico & Moore, 2012), offering support for Berntsen’s social 
identity theory. Meanwhile others have found that positive emotion can actually lead to 
greater levels of inaccuracy (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Demiray & Freund, 2015; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 2006b; Levine & Bluck, 2004), which is more consistent with the results found in 
laboratory-based studies. 
Furthermore, across these studies, there are two issues which make the interpretation 
and comparability between them difficult. Firstly, the events themselves are often two 
separate events (one representative of each valence) that are arguably different in their 
qualities (Koppel et al., 2013; Kraha et al., 2014). For example, positive events are often 
personal ones such as being accepted to college, while the negative events are frequently 
public events such as natural disasters or tragedies, like the 9/11 terror attack (Kraha et al., 
2014; Kraha & Boals, 2014; Liu et al., 2012). Therefore, it is difficult to know whether the 
differences in memory measures are due to the valence of the events or due to other 




Secondly, previous studies have relied upon one single follow-up assessment which is 
often obtained at different intervals across studies. However, having a single memory 
assessment prevents us from being able to understand how emotional autobiographical 
memories may manifest over time. Likewise, the duration between the event and the initial 
assessment may also vary for positive and negative events. For example, previous evidence 
suggests that short-term assessments yield similar levels of consistency and confidence for 
positive and negative events (Talarico & Moore, 2012) while longer intervals lead to better 
memory accuracy but lower confidence for negative events (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b). 
Therefore, these conflicting findings may simply be due to the differences in the duration 
between the event and the assessment of memory as opposed to the direct effects of valence.  
Current Research 
The current research aims to address these two issues by assessing participants’ 
memory for a single event over four separate surveys in order to reveal the effects of valence 
on emotional event memories. Secondly, drawing on the large body of research on flashbulb 
memories, we also aimed to examine how memories for positive and negative public events 
similarly vs. differently rely upon factors that have been implicated in the formation and the 
maintenance of flashbulb memories beyond emotional reactions, including levels of rehearsal 
and personal importance (Conway et al., 1994; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Talarico & Rubin, 
2017).  
To achieve these goals, we assessed memory for the same event – the UK’s 2016 EU 
Referendum in which the public voted for the UK to leave the European Union (EU) 
membership, in (a) UK participants who voted to leave the EU and found the event highly 
positive (i.e., Leave) and (b) UK participants who voted to remain in the EU and found the 
event highly negative (i.e., Remain). The referendum result indicated the UK’s future 




since 1975. Thus, it had the potential to affect lives of many individuals who lived in the UK 
in a range of domains: legislation, the freedom of movement, the UK’s trade with other EU 
countries and so on. Leading up to the official vote, both online- and telephone-polls yielded 
neck and neck results for both Leave and Remain parties, signaling a high level of uncertainty 
in the overall outcome (Barnes, 2016). The marginal ‘Leave’ win with 51.9% of the votes 
(The Electoral Commission, 2016) was met with high levels of surprise both amongst the UK 
public and World-Leaders. Therefore, this political event provided us with an ideal 
opportunity to investigate peoples’ memories for a highly surprising and important event that 
yielded both a positive and negative outcome depending on peoples’ voting choice (i.e. Leave 
vs Remain). As is the case in other studies of public events (Conway et al., 1994; Curci et al., 
2001; Kvavilashvili et al., 2003; Luminet et al., 2004; Tinti et al., 2009), a control group from 
outside the region/country where the event occurred was also included. In this specific event, 
US participants did not vote on the issue and were presumed to have more emotionally 
neutral feelings towards the event; as such, we recruited US residents who did not vote in the 
referendum as the control group. 
Using such a design, we examined the effects of valence on consistency, confidence 
and vividness for memory for the same event over time. In four separate surveys, at one week 
and then, three, nine and 16 months after the EU Referendum results, participants answered a 
number of questions relating to their memory for when they learnt about the EU Referendum 
results. We focused on the consistency of canonical features of the memories (R. Brown & 
Kulik, 1977), including where they were, what time it was, who they were with, how they 
found out (source of information), what they were doing beforehand, and what they did 
afterwards. We also assessed subjective memory vividness, subjective memory confidence, 
positive emotion, negative emotion, and other factors that have been implicated in the 




 UK participants were able to vote in the referendum; an event that was arguably 
highly relevant to their social group status as UK participants. They were thus more likely to 
be invested in the outcome and be directly impacted by the results than US participants were. 
Therefore, we expected that compared to their US counterparts, the two UK voting groups 
would be more likely to form memories that have features similar to flashbulb memories (i.e., 
memories that were more confidently held, more consistent and more vivid) due to their 
higher levels of long-term personal importance, emotional intensity, surprise and rehearsal. 
We also expected Remain participants to report higher ratings of negative emotion than 
Leave participants and US participants because the results of the referendum were not 
congruent with their voting choice. In contrast, we expected that Leave participants expressed 
higher ratings of positive emotion than Remain participants and US participants. Given that 
the previous literature provides mixed results on whether a particular valence is associated 
with more consistent, more vivid and/or more confidently held memories, we did not have a 
specific directional hypothesis but examined a) whether Remain and Leave participants 
demonstrated different levels of memory consistency, vividness and confidence; and b) 
whether any differences between the two groups changed across time. We also examined 
whether the effects of voting choice on our memory measures were mediated by any of the 
factors identified in the literature such as positive emotion, negative emotion, surprise, 
rehearsal and personal importance.  
Methods 
Survey Overview 
The surveys were administered using SurveyGizmo1 (https://www.surveygizmo.com). 
Figure 1 represents the timing of each survey. Survey 1 started on July 01, 2016 - one week 
after the EU Referendum results were announced on June 24, 2016, and continued for a 
                                                 




period of ten days until the 11 July, 2016. For the second and third surveys (Surveys 2 and 3), 
we recruited participants for three weeks and for the fourth survey (Survey 4), the duration of 
recruitment was increased to 3 weeks and 5 days to maximize participant retention. The 
recruitment dates and duration for each follow-up survey were as follows: Survey 
2 was between October 14, 2016 and November 11, 2016, Survey 3 was between April 5, 
2017 and April 26, 2017 and Session 4 was between October 13, 2017 and November 8, 
2017.   
Participants and Recruitment 
Participants were aged between 18 and 87 and resided in either the UK or the US. 
They were recruited through Prolific (https://www.prolific.co/), other websites such 
as http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html, personal communications, the 
Undergraduate Research Panel at the University of Reading in the UK and the Older Adult 
Research Panel at the University of Reading. Participants recruited from Prolific were 
prescreened so that we could target those (i) with a UK or US nationality, (ii) who resided in 
the UK or US, (iii) who were born in the UK or US, (iv) who voted in the EU referendum 
(for UK participants)2 and (v) with a study approval rating of 90% and above which has 
previously been associated with higher quality data (Peer et al., 2014). Participants recruited 
from Prolific were paid £1 after completing each survey and students from the Undergraduate 
Research Panel received course credit after completing each survey. The remaining 
participants received an Amazon money voucher (£1 per survey), or a check (£1 per survey) 
after completing all follow up surveys. Participants signed an electronic version of the 
consent form that was given a favorable opinion by the University Research Ethics 
Committee. 
                                                 
2 This was implemented from Survey 2 onward. While collecting data for Survey 2, we also specifically 
recruited participants who voted to leave the EU in Prolific in order to recruit a similar number of Leave and 




In order to model the change in memory consistency over time, it was important for 
us to have data from participants who had completed the initial survey and at least two other 
follow-up surveys. Considering an expected return rate between 55 and 70% for each survey 
as is seen in previous longitudinal flashbulb memory studies (Holland & Kensinger, 2012; 
Levine & Bluck, 2004), we aimed to recruit at least 150 participants (per group) in the first 
survey to achieve the statistical power of .80 to detect the valence effects observed in 
Kensinger and Schacter (2006) in the final sample. At the end of each survey, participants 
were asked if they would be happy to be contacted again for a follow-up survey and if so, 
were asked to provide an email address. For ethical reasons, only those that stated ‘yes’ to the 
follow-up invitation were invited back. For the third and fourth survey, we invited all 
participants who had previously indicated their willingness to be contacted again, even if they 
had missed a survey in between. For each follow-up study, we also recruited additional 
participants who had not completed the previous survey to increase our statistical power.   
Prior to data analysis, we removed data from participants due to the following 
exclusion criteria. First, we excluded data from those (i) who did not complete the consent 
form process correctly (n = 3), (ii) who provided answers that were not genuine and did not 
answer the questions correctly (n = 1; e.g., entering lengthy paragraphs relating to a 
completely different topic and (iii) those who could not be tracked due to inaccuracies in their 
unique identifying code/ Prolific ID from each individual survey wave (n = 16). Second, we 
checked for duplicated answers and found that 36 participants completed one of the surveys 
more than once; for these participants, we removed their second responses and used their first 
responses in our analyses. We next identified participants who could not be clearly assigned 
to a group (e.g., non-UK nationals who resided in the UK but were not eligible to vote; UK 
nationals who resided in the US); data from these participants (n = 212) were also not 




have more than one survey observation, we could not include data from participants who had 
completed one survey only (n = 899). To ensure reliability of data and to address possible 
occasions of character misrepresentation (Chandler & Paolacci, 2017; Shapiro et al., 2013) in 
the remaining sample, we also excluded data from participants (i) who did not provide 
consistent answers to questions on demographic and voting questions (e.g. gender, voting 
choice, voting eligibility and age) across different surveys and (ii) those who never had a UK 
or US IP address across (Keith et al., 2017) any of the surveys they participated in (n = 29).  
Participants included in the final analysis for memory vividness and confidence 
included a total of 851 individuals comprised of 267 Leave  (149 females; age range: 18-82; 
Mage = 42.94, SD = 14.04; Survey 1: 153, Survey 2: 214, Survey 3: 212, Survey 4: 174), 275 
Remain  (178 females; age range: 18-87; Mage = 40.10, SD = 16.94; Survey 1: 190, Survey 
2: 226, Survey 3: 222, Survey 4: 176) and 309 US participants (149 females; age range: 18-
77; Mage = 36.88, SD = 13.65; Survey 1: 217, Survey 2: 238, Survey 3: 228, Survey 4: 163; 
see Table 1). As memory consistency scores could only be generated if the participant had 
taken part in the initial survey (see Coding of Autobiographical Memories), analyses on this 
measure were performed on data from a sub-set of participants who completed the first 
survey: 153 Leave  (90 females; age range: 18-83; Mage = 43.07, SD = 15.21; Survey 1: 153, 
Survey 2: 140, Survey 3: 98, Survey 4: 80), 190 Remain  (120 females; age range: 18-87; 
Mage = 41.94, SD = 17.69; Survey 1: 195, Survey 2: 172, Survey 3: 139, Survey 4: 112) and 
217 US participants (91 females; age range: 18-75; Mage = 37.41, SD = 13.79; Survey 1: 
217, Survey 2: 177, Survey 3: 144, Survey 4: 94)3. 
                                                 
3 To compare those who completed Survey 1 only vs. those who completed Survey 1 and later 
surveys, a series of 2 (returning status: Survey 1 only vs. returning participants) x 3 (voting 
group: Remain, Leave vs. US) ANOVAs were conducted as well as a chi-square test of 
independence for gender (males vs. females) by returning status (Survey 1 only vs. returning 
participants). These analyses showed that there were no differences in those who dropped out 





Each survey began with an electronic information sheet, detailing the purpose and aim 
of the study along with an electronic consent form. Each returning participant was also sent a 
unique identifying code that they generated in the previous survey, allowing us to track them 
over time. Participants were told that the study concerned their memories for the UK’s 2016 
EU referendum. The main content in each survey was similar across the four surveys (see: 
https://osf.io/swu5a/). In the current study, we focused on the following questions: a) 
participants’ voting choice, b) their memories of learning the outcome of the EU referendum, 
and c) potential predictors of the formation and maintenance of flashbulb memories 
implicated in the literature (see Table 2 for a summary of the questions that are relevant to the 
results presented in this paper).  
Voting choice. Participants were asked to indicate their voting eligibility (“Were you 
eligible to vote in the 2016 UK's EU referendum?”; Question 9 in Table 2). Those who 
indicated that they were eligible were further asked to indicate their voting choice (“How did 
you vote?”; Question 10) with three options: (a) “to leave the EU”, (b) “to remain in the EU” 
or (c) “I was eligible but did not vote”.  
                                                 
vividness, F (1, 902) = 1.98, p = .16, η2 = .002, surprise, F (1, 902) = 0.07, p = .79, η2 = .001, 
personal importance, F (1, 902) = 1.03, p = .47, η2 = .001, or negative emotion, F (1, 902) = 
1.25, p = .27, η2 = .001. However, we found significant main effects of returning status for 
age, F (1, 902) = 14.46, p < .00, η2 = 0.02, and a significant interaction for level of education, 
F (2, 894) = 6.51, p < .01, η2 = 0.01. Those who returned to the survey were older (M = 38.77, 
SD = 15.45) than adults who dropped out (M = 35.45, SD = 13.73) and among Remain 
participants, those who dropped out had lower levels of education (M = 4.04, SD = 0.93) than 
those who returned (M = 4.42, SD = 1.02; p < .001). In addition, we found a main effect of 
returning status for initial levels of rehearsal, F (1, 894) = 6.24, p = .015, η2 = 0.01, indicating 
that returning participants reported higher levels of rehearsal (M = 3.94, SD = 1.03) compared 
to those who did not return (M = 3.74, SD = 1.12). The same was found for initial levels of 
positive emotion, F (1, 901) = 4.01, p = .045, η2 = 0.004. When examining the number of 
surveys taken, we found a main effect of group, F (1,558) = 9.58, p < .001, η2 = 0.02. Post-
hoc comparisons using Bonferroni’s correction found that Remain participants, on average, 




Memory properties. We administered six questions to establish consistency of their 
memories (Questions 2-7 in Table 2) by asking for their circumstances when they found out 
the results of the referendum. The questions were taken from previous studies on flashbulb 
memories (e.g. R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Hirst et al., 2009) and covered the following 
aspects: (i) the time: “What time was it when you found out the results?”; (ii) the source of 
information: “How did you learn the outcome?”; (iii) the location: “Where were you when 
you found out the results?”; (iv) other people: “Who else was there when you found out?”; 
(v) activities beforehand: “What were you doing beforehand?”; and (vi) activities afterwards: 
“What did you do immediately after finding out the results?” For the question about the 
source of information, participants were asked to select if they had learned the outcome 
through a) the television, b) the internet, c) friends and family, d) a newspaper, e) the radio or 
f) other. For the remaining questions, participants were asked to describe their circumstances 
in one sentence. They were also told that their responses to these questions should be 
specific. We also assessed subjective vividness of their memory (“How vividly do you 
remember the time you became aware of the referendum outcome?”; Question 1) with a 7-
point Likert scale (1: “not very” – 7: “extremely”). In Survey 2 and subsequent surveys, we 
also measured their memory confidence (“How confident are you in your overall recollection 
of when you found out the referendum results?”; Question 8) again with a 7-point Likert 
scale (1: “not at all” – 7: “extremely”).  
Potential predictors.  
Positive and negative emotion. Participants were presented with five items (angry, 
sad, anxious, happy and proud) and asked to indicate how strongly they felt each of these 
emotions when they thought of the referendum (Questions 11a-11e; all with 7-point Likert 




Two separate scores were created: one to reflect negative emotion by averaging the 
three items on negative emotion (angry, sad and anxious; α = .89) and one to reflect positive 
emotion by averaging the two items on positive emotion (happy and proud; r = .91, p < .001; 
see S-Table 1 for their correlations at Survey 1).  
Surprise. Participants also indicated how strongly they felt surprise when they 
thought of the referendum (Question 11f; using the same 7-point Likert scale as the one used 
for other emotional states). Although surprise is considered to be an emotional reaction, it is 
often considered to be a separate predictor to emotional intensity (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; 
Conway et al., 1994; Er, 2003; Finkenauer et al., 1998). In addition, surprise is often 
emotionally neutral (Fontaine et al., 2007). Therefore, ratings of surprise were used as an 
independent measure from the other items on emotion. 
Personal importance. Levels of personal importance were assessed using a single 
question (“How important are the referendum results to you?”) with a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (“not important”) to 7 (“extremely important”; Table 2, Question 12). The 
question was based on similar items used in previous studies on memories for public events 
(Holland & Kensinger, 2012; Kensinger et al., 2005).  
 Rehearsal. We also assessed levels of rehearsal. In Survey 1, we used four questions 
(Questions 13-16). Three of them were obtained from previous studies (e.g. Bohn & 
Berntsen, 2007; Conway et al., 1994; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006a) and asked participants to 
indicate: 1) how much they followed the media coverage of the referendum result in the past 
week, 2) how much they thought about the referendum since finding out the results, and 3) 
how much they talked about the referendum with their friends/family and colleagues. We 
also expected that many participants relied on the internet to gather information (Hirst et al., 
2010; Luminet et al., 2004; E. G. Schaefer et al., 2011) and therefore added one more 




in the past week. For all questions, participants were asked to indicate the most appropriate 
option on a scale ranging from 1 (“rarely or none of the time or less than 1 day”) to 5 
(“daily”). In Surveys 2-4, we used similar questions (Questions 17-19) but changed them to 
assess how much participants had engaged in each activity since the previous survey. We also 
used a 7-point Likert scales (1: “Very little” – 7: “A great deal”) in these follow up 
assessments. 
A current rehearsal score was calculated for Surveys 2, 3 and 4 by averaging the four 
questions (Questions a-d for 17-19 respectively;  values >.92). We also obtained the 
average level of rehearsal at Survey 1 by averaging Questions 13-16 ( = .92); since these 
questions were answered using a different scale (a 5-point scale) than rehearsal-related 
questions in the rest of the surveys (a 7-point scale), we did not compare levels of rehearsal at 
Survey 1 versus those at the follow-up surveys. 
Coding of Autobiographical Memories 
In order to assess memory consistency over time, the participants’ responses to the six 
main questions (Questions 2-7) from each survey were coded using an adapted version of the 
Hirst et al. (2009) coding scheme (see Supplementary Materials for further details). This 
allowed us to create a consistency score for each of the six questions by comparing the 
coding values in Survey 1 with coding values in Surveys 2, 3 and 4 separately, using the 
Survey 1 coding value as the baseline measure. Unlike other coding schemes that allow for 
memories to be considered consistent with varying levels of specificity (e.g. Neisser & 
Harsch, 1992), the one developed by Hirst and colleagues uses a two-point classification 
scheme in which responses are classified as either inconsistent or consistent. For example, if 
the coding values in Surveys 2, 3 and 4 were the same as Survey 1, the response was given a 
“1” to reflect consistency. If the coding values differed to Survey 1, then a “0” was given to 




consistency of the six questions ranging from 0 to 1. The coding was done by several coders 
who were blind to the survey time and the group the participant belonged to. For each 
question, a subset (5%) of the responses was coded by two coders to assess interrater 
reliability. The percentage agreement between coders was high (>82%); see Supplemental 
Materials for results when we used a coding approach similar to the one used in Neisser and 
Harsch (1992).  
Coding of Changes in Memory Content over Time  
To determine whether a positive event was associated with a greater tendency to 
repeat inconsistent memories than a negative event was and to examine how incorrectly 
remembered memories change over time, we undertook a second round of coding to assess 
the consistency between inter-survey responses (i.e., comparing Survey 2 with Survey 3 and 
Survey 4 and comparing Survey 3 with Survey 4). As done in Hirst et al. (2009), this allowed 
us to examine whether incorrect memories were repeated, corrected or changed in the 
subsequent survey. For each question, a subset (10%) of the responses was coded by two 
coders to assess interrater reliability. The percentage agreement between coders was high 
(>88%).  
Data Analysis 
Effects of residency and voting choice on memory properties. One of our primary 
analyses concerned the effects of voting choice (Leave vs Remain) and residency (UK vs US) 
on memory consistency, memory vividness and memory confidence. A series of analyses 
using structural equation modelling (SEM) were carried out in RStudio (v. 1.3.1093) using 
the lavaan (v. 0.6-7) package (Rosseel, 2012). Specifically, we specified growth curve 
modelling with SEM (Duncan et al., 2006). This model allowed us to estimate whether voting 
groups have any short- (initial levels that are reflected by the intercept) and long-term effects 




consistency, confidence and vividness were treated as the dependent variables and each was 
modelled separately. Orthogonal contrast coding was used to create two group variables; the 
first was used to compare US participants with UK participants (Leave participants = -1, 
Remain participants = -1, and US participants = 2; referred to as UK vs US in the model) and 
the second was used to compare Remain with Leave (Remain participants = 1, Leave 
participants = -1 and US participants = 0; referred to as Leave vs Remain in the model). Each 
model was estimated using maximum likelihood estimations. In addition, a Comparative Fit 
Measure (CFI), the Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) were used to compare the fit of the model. In order to determine a 
good statistical fit, we accepted models that had CFI and TLI values >.90 (Kline, 2016) and 
RMSEA values < .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). 
 Effects of residency and voting choice on emotional experience and other 
potential predictors of memory measures. To examine how residency and voting choice 
affected positive emotion, negative emotion and other potential predictors implicated in the 
formation of flashbulb memories, such as surprise, rehearsal, and personal importance, 
another series of growth curve modelling were carried out in RStudio, again using the lavaan 
package. The dependent variables were participants’ ratings of the intensity of negative 
emotion, positive emotion, surprise, rehearsal, and importance, each of which was modelled 
separately. As in the previous analysis, effect coding was used to create two group variables; 
‘UK vs US’ and ‘Leave vs Remain’. This analysis allowed us to assess whether the initial 
ratings of negative emotion, positive emotion, surprise, rehearsal and personal importance 
differed across residency and voting group; and whether these variables changed over time in 
a similar manner across the three groups of participants. 
Mediation analysis. In order to understand whether levels of the potential predictors 




mediate the effects of residency and voting group on memory consistency, confidence and 
vividness, we ran three separate mediation analyses. Memory consistency, confidence and 
vividness were each treated as the dependent variable in these three separate models. Across 
all three models, the independent variables were residency and voting group and the 
mediation variables were Survey 1 measures of negative emotion, positive emotion, surprise, 
personal importance and rehearsal.  
Results 
Table 1 describes the demographic characteristics of participants included in our 
analyses. Table 3 describes means and standard deviations for our main variables for each 
time point. As described in the Supplemental Materials, our three groups of participants 
differed on measures of age, gender and education. However, controlling for these variables 
did not change most of our key results concerning the differences across the two voting 
groups4. Therefore, we report results from analyses without controlling for age, gender and 
education (see S-Tables 2-3 for results when we controlled these additional variables). 
The section is divided into four subsections. In the first section, we present results 
concerning our first hypothesis that Leave participants should experience more positive 
                                                 
4 There are two exceptions: a) the effects of residency on the slope of memory consistency 
and b) the initial levels of memory vividness. However, for both of these separate analyses, 
the results were largely similar irrespective of whether we controlled for the effects of age, 
gender and education. More specifically, when we did not control for age, gender and 
education, we found a significant difference in the slope of memory consistency between US 
and UK participants, which was no longer significant when we controlled for age, gender and 
education. However, subsequent mediation analyses confirmed a significant difference 
between UK vs. US participants in the slope for memory consistency irrespective of whether 
we controlled the effects of age, gender and education. Likewise, when we did not control for 
age, gender, and education, we found a significant difference in the initial memory vividness 
between Leave and Remain participants. This effect was no longer significant after 
controlling for age, gender and education. Nevertheless, subsequent mediation analyses 
provided a similar picture irrespective of whether we controlled for age, education and 
gender. Specifically, the analysis revealed that Remain vs. Leave participants were 
statistically different in their initial memory vividness due to group differences in importance, 





emotions and Remain participants should experience more negative emotions towards the EU 
referendum. In the second section, we describe the effects of the three groups on our three 
memory measures (i.e., consistency, vividness and confidence). In the third section, we 
describe results concerning whether the three groups differently affect potential predictors of 
flashbulb memories (surprise, personal importance, and rehearsal). Lastly, we present results 
from the mediation analyses, where we examined whether any of these predictors as well as 
our emotion measures mediate the group effects on memory measures. 
Effects of Residency and Voting Choice on Emotional Experiences 
We expected Remain participants to experience more negative emotions than Leave 
and US participants. Likewise, we expected that Leave participants would experience more 
positive emotion than Remain participants and US participants. To test these predictions, 
levels of current negative and positive emotion were separately analyzed using growth curve 
modelling. Growth curve modelling was performed with levels of negative or positive 
emotion as the dependent variable and residency (2: US, -1: Remain, -1: Leave) and voting 
choice (1: Remain vs. -1: Leave) as predictors of growth parameters. The analyses revealed 
that US participants, compared to UK participants, had lower initial levels of both negative, 
β= -.37, t = -10.64, p = < .001, and positive emotion β= -.37, t = -10.35, p < .001, compared 
to UK participants (see Tables 3 - 4). US participants also had a steeper decline in negative 
emotion, β = -.02, t = -2.46, p = .014, while they had a similar decline in positive emotion to 
UK participants (p = .78). Thus, consistent with our prediction, our results suggest that US 
participants experienced more neutral emotion towards the event than UK participants.  
In addition, within our UK participants, Remain participants had higher initial levels 
of negative emotion, β = 1.53, t = 25.94, p <.001, but lower initial levels of positive emotion, 
β = -1.77, t = - 28.26, p <.001, compared to Leave participants. Thus, while UK participants 




negative emotional responses were driven by Remain participants, while positive emotional 
responses were driven by Leave participants. We also found that Remain participants showed 
a steeper decline in their negative emotion than Leave participants, β= -.03, t = -2.73, p = 
.006, though there was no statistically significant difference in the change of positive 
emotions over time between Remain and Leave participants, p = .06. Nevertheless, Remain 
participants still reported significantly stronger negative emotion than Leave participants at 
the last time point (Survey 4), t (393.41) = -19.01, p < .001, d = -1.80, 95% CI [-2.29, -1.86]. 
Likewise, Leave participants still reported significantly stronger positive emotion than 
Remain participants at the last time point, t (387.13) = -11.73, p < .001, d = 2.20, 95% CI [-
1.61, -1.15]. Taken together, these results support our expectation that Remain participants 
experienced more negative emotions about the event throughout the four surveys while Leave 
participants experienced more positive emotions. Thus, our two UK voting groups interpreted 
the event differently in terms of its valence.    
Effects of Residency and Voting Choice on Memory  
Next, we specified growth curve modelling with SEM to address our main research 
question: whether three groups of participants showed differences in measures of memory 
consistency, confidence and vividness over time.  
Memory consistency. The analysis on consistency revealed that UK participants had 
a higher memory consistency score for Survey 2, β = -.05, t = -6.79, p <.001, but a steeper 
decline when compared to US participants, β = .003, t = 2.03 p = .04 (Figure 2). Despite their 
steeper decline in memory consistency, even at Survey 4, UK participants showed more 
consistent memories than US participants, t (572) = -10.03, p < .001, d = -.58, 95% CI [-0.36, 
-0.24] (Figure 3A), supporting our prediction that UK participants formed more consistent 




In addition, while participants in the Leave vs. Remain group were not significantly 
different in their initial memory consistency level at Survey 2 (p = .37), the two voting 
groups significantly differed in the slope; in other words, Leave participants, relative to 
Remain participants, exhibited a quicker rate of decline in memory consistency, β = .01, t = 
2.36, p = .02 (see Table 5A). To follow up this interaction, we computed simple slopes for 
each group separately and found that the difference was being driven by a significant decline 
in memory consistency over time for Leave participants, simple slope = -.01, p = .002, but 
not for Remain participants, simple slope = -.0001, p = .89. Therefore, despite similar initial 
levels of memory consistency, Remain participants (who considered the event to be highly 
negative) maintained more consistent memories about the referendum over time compared to 
Leave participants (who considered the event to be highly positive).  
Memory confidence. A similar analysis on memory confidence (Table 5B) revealed 
that initial confidence levels at Survey 2 (which is reflected by the intercepts) were higher for 
UK participants compared to US participants, β = -.48, t = -11.03, p < .001 (Figure 3B). 
While there were no significant differences between the US and UK participants in their 
slopes (p = .92), these results also support our prediction that UK participants tend to have 
stronger confidence over their memory of the time they found the results of the referendum 
than do US participants.  
In addition, we found significant effects of voting choice on the slope, which was in 
the opposite direction to the memory consistency findings, β = -.03, t = -2.14, p = .03. More 
specifically, Remain participants exhibited a quicker rate of decline in memory confidence 
compared to Leave participants. In contrast, the two voting groups were not significantly 
different in the initial levels of confidence (p =.058). We next computed simple slopes for 
Leave and Remain participants separately. This simple slope analysis showed that while both 




pronounced for Remain participants, Leave simple slope = -.06, p = .008; Remain simple 
slope = -.12, p <.001. These results show that while initial levels of recollection confidence 
were similar across Remain participants (who reported feeling highly negative after the 
event) and Leave participants (who reported feeling positive), Leave participants tended to 
maintain higher levels of confidence over time.  
Memory vividness. A similar analysis on memory vividness (Table 5C) revealed that 
UK participants, compared to US participants, had higher intercepts for their memory 
vividness, β = -.51, t = -13.10, p < .001, with a smaller decline over time (Figure 3C), β = -
.04, t = -4.39, p < .001. As in memory consistency and memory confidence, these results 
support our prediction that UK participants were more likely to have vivid memories for this 
event than US participants were. 
We also found that Remain participants yielded a higher intercept for memory 
vividness compared to Leave participants, β = .10, t = 2.22, p = .027, but had a similar level 
of decline over time (p = .88). Thus, Remain participants initially had more vivid memories 
than Leave participants. However, this effect was no longer significant when controlling for 
age, levels of education and gender (see S-Table 2). 
Effects of Residency and Voting Choice on Changes in Inconsistent Memories over 
Time 
Results reported so far suggest that Remain participants tended to maintain more 
consistent memories, while Leave participants tended to maintain stronger confidence about 
their memories despite their less consistent memories (relative to Remain participants). 
However, these analyses do not tell us changes in the content of inconsistent/incorrect 
memories over time. Specifically, among participants who had reported an inaccurate 
memory at Survey 2, some of them reported their inaccurate memory again at Survey 3 




Survey 3 (“corrected”). If negative emotion, experienced by Remain participants, is 
associated with more accurate memory, Remain participants may show a greater tendency to 
correct inconsistent memories than Leave participants. To test these issues, next, we 
examined whether residency and voting choice affects the changes that occurred in 
inconsistent/inaccurate memories over time.  
As done in previous studies (Hirst et al., 2009, 2015), firstly, we focused on 
inconsistent memories in Survey 2 and then calculated the proportion of memories that were 
then either corrected, repeated or changed to other errors (if the memory was neither 
corrected nor repeated) in Survey 3 (see Table 6). Proportion scores for corrected, repeated 
and changed memories were then calculated by dividing the sum of each memory type by the 
total number of incorrect memories. We then repeated the process but this time, concentrated 
on inconsistent memories in Survey 3 and calculated the proportion of memories that were 
then corrected, repeated or changed in Survey 4.  
Two separate 3 (Group: Remain vs Leave vs US) X 3 (Memory Type: Repeated vs 
Corrected vs Changed) Mixed Measures ANOVAs were carried out on these proportion 
measures to examine how the three groups differed in correcting or repeating their errors. The 
first ANOVA was carried out on participants who had at least one inconsistent memory in 
Survey 2 and then later took part in Survey 3, comprising of 86 Leave participants (47 
females; age range: 18-82; Mage = 44.36, SD = 15.72), 109 Remain participants (71 females; 
age range: 18-83; Mage = 42.16, SD = 17.75) and 116 US participants (51 females; age 
range: 18-70; Mage = 38.12, SD = 13.74). This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
memory type, F(2, 616) = 6.71, p = .001, η2G =  2.13, without a significant interaction 
between group and memory type (p = .97). Post-hoc analysis using a Bonferroni correction 
revealed that across all participants, incorrect memories in Survey 2 were more likely to be 




.30, SD = .34, p < .01), in Survey 3. There was no significant difference between changed 
and corrected memories, p = 1.  
The second ANOVA was carried out on participants who had at least one inconsistent 
memory in Survey 3 and then later took part in Survey 4, including 60 Leave participants (35 
females; age range: 18-82; Mage = 45.90, SD = 15.74), 91 Remain participants (57 females; 
age range: 19-84; Mage = 44.74, SD = 18.55) and 73 US participants (35 females; age range: 
19-70; Mage = 39.51, SD = 13.66). Like the previous ANOVA, there was a main effect of 
memory type, F(2, 442) = 7.24, p <.001, η2G =  3.17, without a significant interaction (p 
=.66). Post-hoc analysis using a Bonferroni correction revealed that once again, there was a 
greater tendency for participants to repeat (M = .42, SD = .39) incorrect memories from 
Survey 3 in Survey 4 than they were to correct them (M = .30, SD = .32, p = .004), or change 
them (M = .28, SD = .35, p = .005).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that incorrect memories were more likely to be 
repeated over time than they were to be corrected irrespective of voting choice or residency. 
Thus, while Remain participants tended to maintain more accurate memories over time than 
the other two groups, once participants formed inaccurate memories, they tended to simply 
maintain the inaccurate memories in a stable manner across all groups.   
Effects of Residency and Voting Choices on Predictive Factors 
The second goal of our study was to examine whether the group differences observed 
in our memory measures were associated with any of the predictive factors implicated in the 
formation and maintenance of flashbulb memories (Breslin & Safer, 2011; Day & Ross, 
2014; Koppel et al., 2013; Talarico & Moore, 2012; Talarico & Rubin, 2008). Before doing 
so, we first tested whether the three groups of participants showed any differences in these 
predictive factors by separately running a series of growth curve modelling for levels of 




The results show that UK participants, compared with US participants, had higher intercepts 
for surprise, β = -.14, t = -3.10, p = .002, personal importance, β = -.80, t = -23.69, p < .001, 
and rehearsal, β = -.67, t = -16.70, p < .001. Thus, in general, relative to our US participants, 
our UK participants considered the referendum outcome as more surprising and more 
personally important, while engaging in more rehearsal. Furthermore, when comparing Leave 
and Remain participants, we found that Remain participants had higher intercepts for 
personal importance, β= .16, t = 3.37, p < .001, and rehearsal β = .19, t = 2.58, p =.01, than 
Leave participants did. However, there was no difference between the two UK groups for the 
intercept of surprise (p = .46). Thus, while both Leave and Remain participants were as 
equally as surprised by the EU referendum results, our Remain participants initially 
considered the EU referendum results to be more personally important and engaged in more 
rehearsal than our Leave participants did. We also found a significant rate of change for US 
participants when compared with UK participants on levels of surprise, β = -.02, t = -2.57, p 
= .01, and importance, β = -.02, t = -2.45, p = .014, but not for rehearsal (p = .67). These 
results indicate that US participants, compared to UK participants, showed steeper levels of 
decline in ratings of surprise and importance but similar levels of decline for rehearsal. We 
did not find any significant rates of change between Remain and Leave participants on levels 
of surprise, importance or rehearsal. 
Effects of Predictive Factors on Memory: Mediation Analysis  
 To address whether positive and negative emotion and any of other predictive factors 
such as surprise, personal importance and rehearsal are associated with different patterns in 
memory consistency across Leave vs. Remain participants, we ran a mediation analysis on 
memory consistency. The mediation effects were tested using the delta method within the 
lavaan package. We found that rehearsal in Survey 1 mediated the relationship between 




Specifically, our Remain participants reported greater levels of rehearsal, β= .35, t = 6.54, p 
< .001, and greater levels of rehearsal in turn led to a smaller decline in memory consistency 
over time (see Table 8A; Figure 4), β= .01, t = 2.31, p = .02. These results indicate that 
Remain participants maintained memory consistency better than Leave participants over time 
because they had higher levels of initial rehearsal. We also found that positive emotion in 
Survey 1 mediated the relationship between voting choice and initial memory consistency, β 
= 0.03, t = 2.36, p = .018. In other words, Leave participants had higher levels of positive 
emotion at Survey 1, β= -1.74, t =-21.73, p < .001, which led to less consistent memories in 
Survey 2, β= -0.02, t = -2.38, p = .02. None of the other predictive factors showed significant 
effects on the slope or intercept.  
Two separate mediation models, one for the growth curve of memory confidence (see 
Table 8B; Figure 5) and another for that of memory vividness (see Table 8C; Figure 6), were 
also carried out to test the potential mediating effects of the predictive factors on the 
relationship between voting group and vividness and voting group and confidence. Both 
models identified personal importance and rehearsal as significant mediators for the effects of 
residency on the intercepts, β= -0.19, t = -3.79, p < .001 and β= -0.12, t = -3.47, p = .001, for 
memory confidence and β= -0.15, t = -3.44, p = .001 and β= -0.16, t = -6.79, p < .001, for 
memory vividness. More specifically, compared with US participants, UK participants 
engaged in more rehearsal (memory confidence, β = -.44, t = -15.23, p <.001; memory 
vividness, β = -.44, t = -15.67, p < .001), and reported higher levels of importance (memory 
confidence, β = -.77, t = -18.63, p < .001; memory vividness, β = -.77, t = -18.70, p < .001). 
Higher levels of rehearsal and importance in turn, predicted higher levels of the intercepts 
both for memory confidence (rehearsal, β = .28, t = 3.53, p = <.001; importance, β = .25, t = 
3.86, p < .001) and memory vividness (rehearsal, β = .37, t = 7.63, p < .001; importance, β= 




and vividness among UK participants may be driven by higher levels of perceived 
importance and stronger engagement in rehearsal.  
In addition, we found that the effects of voting choice on the intercept of memory 
vividness were mediated by three competing effects: a) importance, b) positive emotion, and 
c) rehearsal. Specifically, relative to Leave participants, Remain participants reported higher 
levels of importance, β = 0.28, t = 4.68, p <.001, and higher levels of rehearsal, β = .34, t = 
6.33 p <.001, both of which in turn predicted higher levels of the intercept for memory 
vividness (rehearsal, β = .37, t = 7.63, p = <.001; importance, β = .19, t = 3.55, p < .001). At 
the same time, Leave participants (relative to Remain participants) reported higher levels of 
positive emotion, β = -1.76, t = -22.13, p <.001, which resulted in higher levels of the 
intercept for memory vividness, β = .09, t = 2.11, p = .035. Thus, while our Leave 
participants showed lower levels of initial memory vividness than Remain participants in our 
previous analysis (Table 5), this additional analysis suggests that positive emotion 
experienced by Leave participants did not impair memory vividness; Instead, positive 
emotion facilitated memory vividness. Our results further indicate that less vivid memories 
among Leave participants, relative to Remain participants, are driven by the effects of 
rehearsal and importance.  
 The models also tested the mediation effects on the slopes of memory confidence 
and memory vividness but none of the predictive factors were found to be significant 
mediators on the slope for memory confidence. For memory vividness, personal importance 
at Survey 1 significantly affected the slope, β= -.03, t = -2.20, p = .03, suggesting that 
personal importance may mediate the effects of voting choice on changes in memory 






Decades of research has shown that emotion has facilitative effects on memory 
(Kensinger, 2009; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Mather & Sutherland, 2009; Talmi, 2013). 
However, previous research does not provide a clear pattern with regards to the effects of 
valence. Specifically, research in laboratory settings often demonstrates that negative valence 
leads to mnemonic advantages over positive valence (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Ochsner, 
2000), whereas research on autobiographical memories suggests that positive events are 
remembered better than negative ones (D’Argembeau et al., 2003; Ford et al., 2012; A. 
Schaefer & Philippot, 2005; Walker et al., 2003). Research on memories for emotional public 
events and flashbulb memories also provides mixed evidence on the effects of valence on 
memory consistency and confidence (Talarico & Rubin, 2017), possibly due to the lack of 
comparability across surveys in terms of the number of follow-up surveys, the duration 
between the event and memory assessment and the types of events that are used.  
To address these issues within the literature, in the current study, we examined 
peoples’ memory for the UK’s 2016 EU Referendum results. Over four surveys, spanning 16 
months, we tested whether memories for the same event differed in the short and long-term 
measures of memory consistency, vividness and confidence across those who perceived the 
event to be positive (those who voted to leave the EU) and those who perceived the event to 
be negative (those who voted to remain in the EU), and US participants who served as 
controls. Thus, the current study has advantages in the sense that the same event was used for 
each valence thereby controlling for potential differences in the characteristics of the event. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the two UK groups, compared to their US 
counterparts, reported higher levels of personal importance, higher engagement in rehearsal 
(as assessed by thinking, attention to the media and the Internet and through conversations), 
stronger feelings of surprise, and stronger emotional reactions. The UK participants, relative 




vividness, both initially and over time. These findings are consistent with the literature and 
suggest that flashbulb memories are typically formed for more surprising, emotional and 
personally important events (R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway et al., 1994).  
According to Berntsen’s social identity theory (Berntsen, 2009), when a public event 
is relevant and important to a particular social group, it can elicit emotional reactions and 
help sustain rehearsal among its members. This could explain why we found lower levels of 
memory vividness, confidence and consistency among the US participants because it is 
unlikely that their social identity, as US participants, was relevant to the UK’s EU 
referendum results. Our findings lend support to previous studies that have found evidence 
for similar group-level effects (e.g. Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; R. Brown & Kulik, 1977; 
Conway et al., 1994; Curci et al., 2001; Er, 2003; Kvavilashvili et al., 2003) and suggest that 
when facing an emotional, important and surprising public event, individuals from a social 
group for which the event was relevant, were more likely to form consistent and vivid 
memories that were recalled with greater confidence.  
In addition to the difference between UK vs. US participants, we also found that the 
two UK groups showed different reactions to the event; while Remain participants were just 
as surprised as Leave participants were, Remain participants reported stronger negative 
emotion and weaker positive emotion as well as higher levels of personal importance, and 
engaged in rehearsal more than Leave participants did. These two groups also differed in 
their memory performance. Specifically, Remain participants were initially just as confident 
and consistent in their memories three months after the referendum results as Leave 
participants. However, over time, participants who voted to remain became more consistent 
but less confident in their memory for the EU referendum results than those who voted to 
leave. This was true even when we re-coded the data to allow for less specific memories 




These results are consistent with previous laboratory findings in which negative 
emotion has been associated with greater memory consistency and/or event accuracy (Bohn 
& Berntsen, 2007; Holland & Kensinger, 2012) and positive emotion has been associated 
with greater confidence (Holland & Kensinger, 2012; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Levine 
& Bluck, 2004). Recent experimental research has also demonstrated that relative to positive 
emotion, negative emotion enhances the mnemonic precision (Cooper et al., 2019; Xie & 
Zhang, 2017). One theory which explains this valence effect is the affect-as-information 
framework (Clore et al., 2001) which suggests that positive and negative valence have 
differing effects on how we process information; in particular, positive valence is associated 
with focus on global characteristics of the event and less accurate memory for details, while 
negative valence is associated with increased sensory details that are stored, maintained and 
remembered (Bowen et al., 2018). Thus, overconfidence among Leave participants compared 
to Remain participants and greater memory consistency in Remain participants compared to 
Leave participants, may be due to the effects of valence on the way these participants 
processed the event. In line with this idea, in our mediation analysis, we found that higher 
levels of positive emotion experienced at Survey 1 among Leave participants led to less 
consistent memory for them than Remain participants. Although we did not find significant 
effects of negative emotion, these results corroborate previous laboratory findings and 
suggest that mnemonic disadvantage of positive relative to negative emotion can be extended 
to memories for real life events. 
In addition to positive emotion, our mediation analysis also highlighted the role of 
rehearsal. Specifically, higher initial rehearsal levels at Survey 1 among Remain enabled 
them to maintain more consistent memories even after a long-term delay. Although it has not 
always been found to predict memory consistency and/or accuracy (Day & Ross, 2014; Hirst 




been implicated as an important factor in maintaining flashbulb memories (Bohannon, 1988; 
Neisser et al., 1996). In particular, it has often been highlighted in studies examining positive 
and negative flashbulb memories because positive events are often spontaneously rehearsed 
more than negative ones (Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; Breslin & Safer, 2011; Tekcan, 2001; 
Walker et al., 2009). While these patterns are the opposite from what we saw in this study 
(where Leave participants who experienced positive emotion engaged in less rehearsal than 
Remain participants who experienced negative emotion), it is important to note that the 
effects of valence on rehearsal depend on the conditions after the event, such as increased 
media attention (Breslin & Safer, 2011). In the UK “Brexit”5 headlines have dominated the 
news not only in the immediate aftermath of the Referendum but also for several years after. 
This means that our UK participants were likely to have been faced with constant reminders 
of Brexit irrespective of whether they initially experienced positive or negative emotion. We 
have shown here that in such situations when the amount of external reminders is similar 
following an event, negative memories can be initially rehearsed more which could lead to 
greater memory consistency and higher memory vividness.  
In contrast to memory consistency, we did not find any significant mediators for the 
group differences in the slope of memory confidence ─ a key distinguishing feature of 
flashbulb memories (Talarico & Rubin, 2003, 2017). More specifically, our initial analysis 
showed that participants who voted to leave tended to maintain higher confidence for their 
memory than those who voted to remain (Figure 3B). Yet, when we tested the effects of 
emotional responses, surprise, importance and rehearsal in our mediation analysis, none of 
them significantly mediated this group effect. This was in contrast with previous findings 
from Day and Ross (2014) in which memory confidence was associated with surprise, 
                                                 
5 An abbreviation for “British exit” used to describe the United Kingdom’s decision in 2016 




rehearsal, and emotional response. One possible explanation for the lack of significant 
mediators in our study is that some of the mediators included in the model did play a role but 
our sample size was too small to detect their effects; in fact, our sample size was determined 
to have sufficient statistical power to detect the group differences but not to detect such 
mediation effects (see Participants and Recruitment). But it is also possible that the group 
difference in memory confidence comes from group differences during retrieval rather than 
group differences during encoding, such as differences in the ease of retrieval or in the social 
expectations concerning what one ought to remember (Echterhoff & Hirst, 2006). Future 
research needs to include a larger number of participants with more comprehensive 
assessments of factors relevant to retrieval to understand how differently positive vs. negative 
public events affect memory confidence.  
Another important aspect of memory investigated in the literature on emotion and 
memory is vividness. Our analyses on memory vividness revealed that Leave and Remain 
participants showed similar rates of decline in their memory vividness over time but Leave 
participants initially had lower ratings relative to Remain participants. This result may appear 
to suggest that positive emotion experienced by Leave participants has an impairing effect on 
memory vividness. However, a subsequent mediation analysis suggested a more complex 
pattern, indicating that this group difference was due to the competing effects of positive 
emotion, rehearsal and importance. Specifically, Leave participants experienced stronger 
positive emotion which in turn significantly led to more vivid memories. However, Leave 
participants also perceived the event as less important and engaged in rehearsal less than 
Remain participants did, which led to less vivid memories. The results were also replicated 
after including other control variables, such as age and education (see Supplemental Results).  
In summary, we found that positive and negative public events are remembered 




the UK’s EU Referendum. Remain participants who experienced negative emotion 
maintained more consistent memories even after 16 months, compared to Leave participants 
who experienced positive emotion. This difference between the two voting groups appears to 
be driven not only by differences in their emotional experiences but also by differences in 
rehearsal. Despite being less consistent, Leave participants maintained higher levels of 
memory confidence than Remain participants. In addition, we found that positive emotion, 
rehearsal, and perceived importance all affect how vividly individuals remembered their 
circumstances in which they found the referendum result. Thus, it appears that memories for 
emotional public events are supported by several pathways beyond the effects of emotion. 
Nevertheless, as described above, our sample size was modest for mediation analyses. Thus, 
results from the series of mediation analyses need to be interpreted with caution; future 
studies with a larger number of participants are needed to confirm the effects of potential 
factors observed in this study. 
While our results are consistent with previous studies on valence on memory 
(Kensinger et al., 2006; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Levine & Bluck, 2004; Ochsner, 
2000), it is also possible that they are not necessarily being driven by valence. For instance, 
while the event was the same for the two UK voting groups, the outcome and implications 
may not have been. According to Brown’s transition theory (2016), an event which is 
perceived to mark the end to life as it was previously known is effective in facilitating the 
formation and maintenance of autobiographical memories. For UK participants, the result of 
the referendum indicated possible changes to many things including current legislation, the 
rights of European Union citizens, public trade practices and immigration rights, to name a 
few. Participants who voted to remain in the UK may have perceived these changes as more 
significant than those who voted to leave in the UK as they are inconsistent with their wishes. 




this study (“Since the EU Referendum results has your life got better, got worse or stayed the 
same?”) in Survey 2, Leave participants were more likely to say that their lives had stayed 
the same compared with Remain participants (92 % vs. 79%; see Supplemental results). 
Thus, Remain participants may have felt that the referendum results had a more direct impact 
on their current lives than Leave participants did, which may have affected their memory 
performance. However, it should be noted that previous studies demonstrate consistent, vivid 
and confident memories for emotional events even when the events are not associated with 
life transitions. For example, several studies have found evidence of vivid memory formation 
following sporting events (e.g. Breslin & Safer, 2011; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Talarico 
& Moore, 2012) which are unlikely to have been significant enough to bring about change to 
an individual’s daily life. Future studies need to test the effects of perceived changes, 
emotional valence and their interaction on memory formation and maintenance to address the 
role of each factor systematically.  
Another factor which may have played a role is arousal. In other words, while valence 
differed between the two UK voting groups, so too could levels of arousal which may affect 
long-term memory accuracy. Arousing information relative to non-arousing information is 
consolidated more effectively (LaBar & Phelps, 1998) through the activation of the 
noradrenergic system and the hippocampal memory formation, resulting in a more stable 
memory over time (McGaugh, 2000, 2004). Emotional arousal can also lead to selective 
memory in which the salient/central details of the event are remembered better but at the 
expense of the non-central details (e.g. central vs. peripheral trade-off; Kensinger et al., 
2007). Since negative events are often associated with stronger arousal levels than positive 
events (Kuppens et al., 2013; Warriner et al., 2013) this may explain why over time, Remain 
participants held more consistent memories than Leave participants did. However, as we did 




contributed to the long-term differences in memory consistency. Future research investigating 
memories for a positive vs. negative event should also include measures of arousal. 
There are also several important limitations that need to be mentioned. The first 
limitation of the current study is that due to its nature, we could not randomly assign 
participants to the two voting groups or the control group (US participants), meaning that the 
results may simply reflect the characteristics of the people who voted to leave or remain in 
the EU referendum rather than reflecting the effects of valence. In fact, the two groups were 
significantly different in their age, gender and levels of education.  In addition to these 
demographic variables, another possible factor that could affect our results is the recruitment 
method. Specifically, Remain participants included more undergraduate students than Leave 
participants who were often recruited via Prolific. On the one hand, this observation is 
consistent with the general voting behavior seen in UK residents: UK residents with 
university degrees and those of a younger age were less likely to vote Leave (Alabrese et al., 
2019). In our supplemental analyses, we also confirmed that controlling for age, gender and 
education did not change our overall results (see Supplemental Results). Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the effects of valence we observed are driven by other factors than valence. In 
addition, the three groups of participants were different in their political orientation; such that 
Leave participants supported conservative political parties more than Remain participants and 
US participants. Thus, it is difficult to establish the causal effects of valence and group 
identity from our results.  
Additionally, we do not have a representative sample in our UK or US participants 
and it is possible that we recruited and retained individuals who were more interested in the 
political consequences of the referendum or those who welcomed the opportunity to share 
their memories and thoughts (i.e., self-selection bias; Heckman, 1990). In fact, when we 




out after completing Survey 1, returning participants reported higher levels of initial rehearsal 
than those who dropped out. Thus, we may have retained a subset of participants who had 
stronger commitment to follow up the event. We also found other differences between the 
two groups of participants in their age, education and positive emotion. Thus, our results are 
unlikely to represent the effects of voting choice and emotion across all UK voters.  
Thirdly, we included US participants as a control group based on similar methods 
used in other studies (e.g. defining groups based on different nationalities; Conway et al., 
1994; Curci et al., 2001; Kvavilashvili et al., 2003; Luminet et al., 2004; Tinti et al., 2009). 
Having a control group allowed us to test the effects of social identity on memory for the 
same event (Berntsen, 2018). Yet it is important to acknowledge the differences between UK 
and US participants beyond their social identity. For example, UK participants, relative to US 
participants, may have had a better understanding of the historical background of the 
referendum, and been exposed to more media coverage of the event. Moreover, we did not 
control for the time at which participants learnt the EU referendum results. Given the event’s 
political nature, results from each region within the UK became available whenever counting 
of the votes within the region was complete up until the official results across the UK were 
published early the following day. This is potentially problematic when also considering the 
time difference between the two countries. For many participants in the UK, the referendum 
outcome was released in the morning; meaning that they learned of the results right after 
waking up. In contrast, for those in the US, it was more likely that they learned of the results 
during the evening. Thus, the difference between our UK and US participants in their 
memory measures could have been due to these other factors.  
In contrast, one of our main focuses of this paper was to examine the differences 
between UK participants who perceived the event as positive vs. those who perceived the 




comparisons between these two groups are less likely to be affected by these factors. 
Nevertheless, some UK participants said that they made a conscious effort to watch the 
results throughout the night; these participants could have learned the results of individual 
regions first and may have been able to predict the outcome before the results were officially 
announced. In contrast, others woke up to the news. Between these two sub-groups of 
participants, levels of surprise may differ, causing differences in the way in which the 
memories were encoded. In addition, when it came to asking participants questions about 
where they were and what they were doing etc., participants who stayed up to watch the 
results, may have provided us with information relating to a different time compared to their 
initial report. In other words, it is possible that those who monitored the results throughout 
the night could have two memories regarding the reception event: one for the time before the 
results were official (i.e., while watching the live footage) and one for after. In the current 
study, we did not obtain information about whether participants stayed awake all night to 
monitor the results or not.  
Another important question for future research concerns rehearsal. Our measure of 
rehearsal includes both overt- (e.g., talking to others about it or watching the media) and 
covert rehearsal (e.g., thinking about it) as well as an item that indicates how much time they 
spent on the internet. Participants’ responses to these four items were highly correlated as 
indicated by the high internal consistency (see Method). When we separately computed 
measures on covert (thinking about) vs. overt rehearsal (talking to others about it, watching 
the media or looking on the internet), they were highly correlated with each other at Survey 
1: r (554) = .85, p < .01. Thus, it was difficult to test their independent effects on our memory 
measures in this study. However, other studies have argued that overt rehearsal is associated 




2013). Future research is therefore needed to test the effects of covert and overt rehearsal on 
memories for positive vs. negative public events.  
Finally, it is also worth noting that over the course of the survey period, the UK 
underwent two significant political events including the official intention of the UK to leave 
the EU within two years (i.e., the triggering of Article 50) on 29th March, 2017 and a general 
election on 8th June, 2017 in which the current governing party lost its majority, resulting in 
the formation of a minority government. Both of these events dominated the news and as 
such may have influenced participants’ emotional reactions and/or memories.  
 In summary, the current study provides evidence that memories surrounding the 
personal circumstances of a significant event that is either interpreted as positive or negative 
can be remembered with a great deal of consistency, vividness and confidence over a year 
later. Furthermore, the results suggest that valence can yield different outcomes on memory 
measures both in the short- and the long-term, and corroborate previous findings whereby 
negative emotion has been associated with better memory consistency while positive emotion 
has been associated with over-confidence (Kensinger et al., 2006). We also found that 
differences in memory between those who found the event as positive vs. negative are not 
only due to emotion, but also due to rehearsal and perceived personal importance. Our 
findings highlight the importance of considering rehearsal, importance and the time between 
the event and when memory measures are obtained when interpreting how individuals 
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Demographic information for participants included in the analysis. 
Group Demographic items Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 Survey 4
(n = 560) (n = 678 ) (n = 662 ) (n = 513)
n 190 226 222 176
Age range in years 18-86 18-87 18-84 19-85
Age Mean (SD) 39.91 (17.25) 39.91 (17.07) 39.67 (16.58) 41.39 (16.99)
Females 120 145 148 110
Recruit Type (n)
Volunteer / Student 134 141 126 96
Prolific 30 59 73 58
Older Adult Research Panel 26 26 23 22
Education Level (%)
15% 8% 18% 15%
Undergraduate Degree 44% 9% 44% 44%
Post-graduate Degree 42% 5% 38% 41%
Prefer not to say / Did not answer 0% 1% 0% 0%
Missing - 77% - -
Political Affiliation (%) ꝉ
Right-wing 11% 4% 14% 13%
Left-wing 42% 10% 37% 50%
Centre 12% 2% 14% 11%
Other 13% 1% 8% 3%
Prefer not to say / None 22% 6% 27% 23%
Missing 0% 77% 0% 1%
n 153 214 212 174
Age range in years 18-82 18-82 18-82 19-83
Age Mean (SD) 41.24 (14.95) 42.94 (14.28) 43 (13.84) 44.36 (13.08)
Females 90 121 116 96
Recruit Type (n)
Volunteer / Student 16 23 22 14
Prolific 127 178 178 150
Older Adult Research Panel 10 13 12 10
Education Level (%)
46% 16% 48% 45%
Undergraduate Degree 41% 13% 37% 39%
Post-graduate Degree 11% 4% 14% 13%
Prefer not to say / Did not answer 1% 0% 1% 0%
Missing 0% 66% 0% 1%
Political Affiliation (%) ꝉ
Right-wing 50% 17% 62% 49%
Left-wing 14% 5% 9% 19%
Centre 2% 1% 0% 1%
Other 2% 0% 4% 3%
Prefer not to say / None 32% 10% 24% 28%
Missing 0% 67% 1% 0%
n 217 238 228 163
Age range in years 18-74 18-75 19-77 19-77
Age Mean (SD) 36.03 (13.69) 36.97 (13.56) 36.56 (13.47) 38.35 (14.00)
Females 91 105 114 81
Recruit Type (n)
Volunteer / Student 3 6 4 3
Prolific 214 232 224 160
Education Level (%)
41% 9% 35% 37%
Undergraduate Degree 46% 9% 46% 42%
Post-graduate Degree 13% 4% 16% 20%
Prefer not to say / Did not answer 0% 0% 2% 0%
Missing 0% 77% 0% 1%
Political Affiliation (%) ꝉ
Right-wing 18% 5% 18% 17%
Left-wing 47% 13% 50% 48%
Centre 2% 1% 1% 2%
Other 13% 1% 9% 7%
Prefer not to say / None 20% 4% 22% 25%
Missing 0% 77% 0% 1%
ꝉ  Right-wing parties included the Conservatives (UK), United Kingdom National Party (UK) and Republicans (USA), the Left-wing parties included Labour (UK), 















Survey Questions That are Relevant to the Current Analyses
1) How vividly do you remember the time you became aware of the referendum outcome? (1. Not very 7. Extremely)
2) What time was it when you found out the results?
3)
4) Where were you when you found out the results? Please describe in one sentence and be specific. 
5) Who else was there when you found out? Please describe in one sentence and be specific.
6) What were you doing beforehand?
7) What did you do immediately after finding out the results?
Follow-Up Surveys 2, 3 and 4 - Additional memory property questions.
8)
9) Were you eligible to vote in the 2016 UK's EU referendum? 
10) How did you vote? [To remain in the EU/ To leave the EU/ I was eligible but did not vote]














Follow-Up Surveys - Additional rehearsal questions 
17) In the past 3 months.. Using the scale below, please select the most appropriate answer (1 = Very little to 7 = A great deal). 
a. How closely have you followed the media coverage of the referendum result? 
b. Have you thought about the referendum since finding out the results?
c. Have you spent on the internet reading the latest news about the referendum?
d. Have you talked about the referendum with your friends/family and colleagues?
18) In the past 9 months.. Using the scale below, please select the most appropriate answer (1 = Very little to 7 = A great deal).
a. How closely have you followed the media coverage of the referendum result? 
b. Have you thought about the referendum since finding out the results?
c. Have you spent on the internet reading the latest news about the referendum?
d. Have you talked about the referendum with your friends/family and colleagues?
19) In the past 16 months.. Using the scale below, please select the most appropriate answer (1 = Very little to 7 = A great deal).
a. How closely have you followed the media coverage of the referendum result? 
b. Have you thought about the referendum since finding out the results?
c. Have you spent on the internet reading the latest news about the referendum?
d. Have you talked about the referendum with your friends/family and colleagues?
Demographics
20) Please enter your age.
21) Where do you currently reside?
22) Please indicate your nationality.
23) Please indicate your gender / sex. 
24) Please select your highest level of education.
25) What is your political affiliation? If other, please specify.
a. Conservative , b. Labour , c. Scottish National Party , d. Liberal Democrats , e. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) , f. Republican  (USA) , g. 
Democrat (USA) , h. None , i. Prefer not to say  and j. Other 
Emotional Intensity and Surprise
Personal Importance




How strongly do you feel the following emotions when you think of the referendum now? (1. Not at all to 7. Very strongly) 
How did you learn the outcome? [Multiple choice options: TV/ Internet/ Friends or Family/ Newspaper/ Radio / Other] Please use the box below to give 




In the past week how closely have you followed the media coverage of the referendum result? [1. Rarely or none of the time or less than 1 day, 
2. Some (1 - 2 days), 3. Occasionally (3 - 4 days), 4. Most of the time (5 - 6 days), 5. Daily]
Have you thought about the referendum since finding out the results? [1. Rarely or none of the time or less than 1 day, 2. Some (1 - 2 days), 3. 
Occasionally (3 - 4 days), 4. Most of the time (5 - 6 days), 5. Daily]
Have you spent on the internet reading the latest news about the referendum? [1. Rarely or none of the time or less than 1 day, 2. Some (1 - 2 
days), 3. Occasionally (3 - 4 days), 4. Most of the time (5 - 6 days), 5. Daily]
Have you talked about the referendum with your friends/family and colleagues? [1. Rarely or none of the time or less than 1 day, 2. Some (1 - 2 




Memory assessments and survey M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n
Flashbulb Memory Consistency
3 Months 0.71 (0.19) 174 0.67 (0.19) 142 0.55 (0.21) 182
9 Months 0.68 (0.19) 140 0.63 (0.21) 98 0.56 (0.23) 144
16 Months 0.71 (0.19) 113 0.60 (0.18) 80 0.55 (0.20) 94
Flashbulb Memory Confidence 
3 Months 5.91 (1.04) 226 5.75 (1.30) 214 4.37 (1.65) 238
9 Months 5.59 (1.24) 222 5.62 (1.45) 212 4.34 (1.70) 228
16 Months 5.40 (1.26) 176 5.52 (1.43) 174 3.96 (1.75) 163
Flashbulb Memory Vividness
0 Months 6.53 (0.83) 190 6.25 (1.14) 153 5.1 (1.73) 217
3 Months 6.21 (1.06) 226 6.01 (1.37) 214 4.13 (1.84) 238
9 Months 6.05 (1.17) 222 5.97 (1.34) 212 4.16 (1.78) 228
16 Months 5.77 (1.38) 176 5.58 (1.70) 174 3.65 (1.70) 163
Negative Emotion
0 Months 5.31 (1.34) 190 2.36 (1.35) 153 2.66 (1.57) 217
3 Months 5.00 (1.51) 226 2.08 (1.29) 214 2.23 (1.37) 238
9 Months 4.96 (1.55) 222 1.99 (1.17) 212 2.39 (1.52) 228
16 Months 4.89 (1.63) 176 2.24 (1.30) 174 2.18 (1.43) 163
Positive Emotion
0 Months 1.22 (0.59) 190 4.70 (1.92) 153 2.07 (1.67) 216
3 Months 1.33 (0.72) 226 4.69 (1.97) 214 1.83 (1.47) 238
9 Months 1.29 (0.62) 222 4.97 (1.75) 212 1.95 (1.58) 228
16 Months 1.30 (0.72) 176 4.47 (1.91) 174 1.77 (1.46) 163
Personal Importance
0 Months 6.41 (0.78) 189 5.83 (1.31) 153 3.81 (1.64) 217
3 Months 6.14 (1.01) 226 5.83 (1.26) 214 3.41 (1.53) 238
9 Months 5.99 (1.15) 222 5.93 (1.22) 212 3.51 (1.62) 228
16 Months 6.06 (1.12) 176 5.80 (1.25) 174 3.29 (1.63) 163
Surprise 
0 Months 3.95 (1.79) 190 4.22 (1.84) 153 3.69 (1.77) 217
3 Months 3.77 (1.82) 226 3.73 (1.89) 214 3.11 (1.87) 238
9 Months 3.53 (1.67) 222 3.83 (1.78) 212 3.14 (1.92) 228
16 Months 3.65 (1.65) 176 3.59 (1.74) 174 2.79 (1.68) 163
Rehearsal
0 Months * 4.25 (0.86) 190 3.55 (1.09) 150 2.57 (1.02) 216
3 Months 4.83 (1.42) 226 4.41 (1.61) 214 2.69 (1.46) 238
9 Months 4.68 (1.40) 222 4.53 (1.44) 212 2.66 (1.38) 228
16 Months 4.37 (1.43) 176 4.15 (1.45) 174 2.36 (1.30) 163
* Rehearsal measures were recorded on a 5 point Likert scale for Survey 1 and on a 7 point Likert scale 
for Surveys 2 (3 months), 3 (9 months) and 4 (16 months).  
Remain Leave US
Table 3.
Consistency, Confidence and Vividness in Flashbulb Memories and Negative Emotion, 
Personal Importance, Surprise and Rehearsal as a Function of Voting Group and 















3.23 (0.05)*** 65.92 3.13 - 3.32 2.68 (0.05) *** 51.99 2.58 - 2.78
US vs UK -0.37 (0.03)*** -10.64 -0.43 - -0.30 -0.37 (0.04)*** -10.35 -0.45 - -0.30
Remain vs Leave 1.53 (0.06)*** 25.94 1.42 - 1.65 -1.77 (0.06)*** -28.26 -1.89 - -1.65
-0.03 (0.01)** -3.26 -0.04 - -0.01 -0.02 (0.01)* -2.21 -0.04 - -0.002
US vs UK -0.02 (0.01)* -2.46 -0.03 - -0.003 0.002 (0.01) 0.27 -0.01 - 0.01
Remain vs Leave -0.03 (0.01)** -2.73 -0.05 - -0.01 0.02 (0.01) 1.90 -0.001 - 0.04
0.09 (0.26) 0.32 -0.43 - 0.60 -0.14 (0.39) -0.37 -0.90 - 0.62
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.970 0.987
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.967 0.986
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.085 0.051
 * p  < .05.    ** p  < .01.    *** p < .001.
Growth Curve Models of Negative and Positive Emotion





b  (SE) t-value 95% CI
A. Negative Emotion B. Positive Emotion
95% CI
Table 5. 
b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI
0.64 (0.01)*** 63.35 0.62 - 0.66 5.46 (0.06)*** 96.94 5.35 - 5.57 5.82 (0.05)*** 115.27 5.73 - 5.92
US vs UK -0.05 (0.01)*** -6.79 -0.06 - -0.04 -0.48 (0.04)*** -11.03 -0.56 - -0.39 -0.51 (0.04)*** -13.10 -0.58 - -0.43
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.01) 0.86 -0.01 - 0.03 0.12 (0.06) 1.90 -0.004 - 0.24 0.10 (0.05)* 2.22 0.01 - 0.20
-0.003 (0.002) -1.48 -0.01 - 0.00 -0.08 (0.01)*** -6.77 -0.11 - -0.06 -0.14 (0.01)*** -12.35 -0.16 - -0.12
US vs UK 0.003 (0.002)* 2.03 0.00 - 0.01 0.001 (0.01) 0.10 -0.02 - 0.02 -0.04 (0.01)*** -4.39 -0.05 - -0.02
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.002)* 2.36 0.00 - 0.01 -0.03 (0.01)* -2.14 -0.06 - -0.003 -0.002 (0.01) -0.14 -0.03 - 0.02
-0.40 (0.17)* -2.38 -0.73 - -0.07 0.27 (0.21) -1.29 -0.67 - 0.14 0.31 (0.30) 1.03 -0.28 - 0.90
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.988  － 0.998  － 0.939
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.965  － 0.995  － 0.920
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.047  － 0.021  － 0.091
 * p  < .05.    ** p  < .01.    *** p  < .001.












A. Surprise B. Importance C. Rehearsal
3.80 (0.06)*** 58.64 3.68 - 3.93 5.27 (0.04)*** 118.45 5.18 - 5.36 4.15 (0.06)*** 71.20 4.03 - 4.26
US vs UK -0.14 (0.04)** -3.10 -0.22 - -0.05 -0.8 (0.03)*** -23.69 -0.87 - -0.74 -0.67 (0.04)*** -16.70 -0.74 - -0.59
Remain vs Leave -0.06 (0.08) -0.74 -0.22 - 0.1 0.16 (0.05)*** 3.37 0.07 - 0.26 0.19 (0.07)** 2.58 0.05 - 0.33
-0.09 (0.01)*** -7.02 -0.12 - -0.07 -0.05 (0.01)*** -5.75 -0.07 - -0.03 -0.09 (0.01)*** -9.18 -0.11 - -0.07
US vs UK -0.02 (0.01)** -2.57 -0.04 - -0.01 -0.02 (0.01)*** -2.45 -0.03 - -0.003 0.003 (0.01) 0.42 -0.01 - 0.02
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.02) 0.35 -0.03 - 0.04 -0.01 (0.01) -0.52 -0.02 - 0.01 -0.01 (0.01) -0.90 -0.03 - 0.01
-0.44 - 0.12 -3.80 -0.66 - -0.21 -0.11 (0.10) -1.16 -0.30 - 0.08 -0.33 (0.15)* -2.14 -0.63 - -0.03
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)  － 0.935  － 0.982  － 0.992
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)  － 0.907  － 0.978  － 0.981
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)  － 0.066  － 0.061  － 0.061







95% CI 95% CI
Growth Curve Models of the Predictive Factors  (A) Surprise, (B) Rehearsal and (C) Importance





b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI
Importance predicted by:
US vs UK -0.77 (0.04)*** -18.34 -0.85 - -0.69 -0.77 (0.04)*** -18.63 -0.85 - -0.69 -0.77 (0.04)*** -18.70 -0.85 - -0.69
Remain vs Leave 0.29 (0.06)*** 4.84 0.17 - 0.41 0.29 (0.06)*** 4.90 0.17 - 0.40 0.28 (0.06)*** 4.68 0.16 - 0.39
Negative emotion predicted by:
US vs UK -0.39 (0.04)*** -9.12 -0.48 - -0.31 -0.39 (0.04)*** -9.18 -0.48 - -0.31 -0.39 (0.04)*** -9.14 -0.48 - -0.31
Remain vs Leave 1.47 (0.07)*** 20.19 1.33 - 1.62 1.47 (0.07)*** 20.10 1.32 - 1.61 1.46 (0.07)*** 19.97 1.32 - 1.61
Positive emotion predicted by:
US vs UK -0.30 (0.04)*** -6.38 -0.39 - -0.20 -0.30 (0.05)*** -6.44 -0.39 - -0.21 -0.30 (0.05)*** -6.44 -0.39 - -0.21
Remain vs Leave -1.74 (0.08)*** -21.73 -1.90 - -1.59 -1.75 (0.08)*** -22.13 -1.9 - -1.59 -1.76 (0.08)*** -22.13 -1.91 - -1.60
Rehearsal predicted by:
US vs UK -0.44 (0.03)*** -14.99 -0.50 - -0.38 -0.44 (0.03)*** -15.23 -0.5 - -0.38 -0.44 (0.03)*** -15.57 -0.50 - -0.39
Remain vs Leave 0.35 (0.05)*** 6.54 0.25 - 0.46 0.35 (0.05)*** 6.56 0.25 - 0.45 0.34 (0.05)*** 6.33 0.23 - 0.44
Surprise predicted by:
US vs UK -0.13 (0.05)** -2.56 -0.23 - -0.03 -0.13 (0.05)** -2.54 -0.23 - -0.03 -0.13 (0.05)** -2.56 -0.23 - -0.03
Remain vs Leave -0.13 (0.10) -1.34 -0.32 - 0.06 -0.14 (0.10) -1.37 -0.33 - 0.06 -0.14 (0.10) -1.46 -0.34 - 0.05
Intercept predicted by:
Importance 0.01 (0.01) 1.09 -0.01 - 0.03 0.25 (0.06)*** 3.86 0.12 - 0.37 0.19 (0.05)*** 3.55 0.09 - 0.30
Negative Emotion 0.002 (0.01) 0.28 -0.01 - 0.02 -0.05 (0.05) -0.85 -0.15 - 0.06 0.05 (0.04) 1.32 -0.03 - 0.13
Positive Emotion -0.02 (0.01)* -2.38 -0.03 - -0.003 0.05 (0.05) 1.02 -0.05 - 0.15 0.09 (0.04)* 2.11 0.01 - 0.16
Rehearsal -0.01 (0.01) -0.76 -0.03 - 0.01 0.28 (0.08)*** 3.53 0.12 - 0.43 0.37 (0.05)*** 7.63 0.28 - 0.47
Surprise 0.001 (0.01) 0.18 -0.01 - 0.01 0.05 (0.04) 1.28 -0.03 - 0.12 0.05 (0.03) 1.84 -0.003 - 0.10
US vs UK -0.05 (0.01)*** -5.03 -0.07 - -0.03 -0.17 (0.06)** -2.63 -0.29 - -0.04 -0.14 (0.05)** -2.90 -0.24 - -0.05
Remain vs Leave -0.03 (0.02) -1.35 -0.06 - 0.01 0.11 (0.12) 0.98 -0.12 - 0.35 0.003 (0.09) 0.04 -0.17 - 0.17
Slope predicted by:
Importance -0.004 (0.002) -1.83 -0.01 - 0.00 -0.03 (0.02) -1.43 -0.06 - 0.01 -0.03 (0.01)* -2.20 -0.05 - -0.003
Negative Emotion -0.002 (0.002) -1.25 -0.01 - 0.001 0.02 (0.01) 1.41 -0.01 - 0.05 0.01 (0.01) -0.001 -0.02 - 0.02
Positive Emotion 0.001 (0.002) 0.65 -0.002 - 0.004 0.02 (0.01) 1.14 -0.01 - 0.04 0.01 (0.01) 0.93 -0.01 - 0.03
Rehearsal 0.01 (0.002)* 2.31 0.001 - 0.01 -0.02 (0.02) -0.81 -0.06 - 0.02 0.01 (0.01) 0.58 -0.02 - 0.04
Surprise 0.001 (0.001) -0.01 -0.002 - 0.002 -0.01 (0.01) -0.61 -0.03 - 0.01 -0.004 (0.01) -0.53 -0.02 - 0.01
US vs UK 0.002 (0.002) 0.99 -0.002 - 0.01 -0.01 (0.01) -1.01 -0.04 - 0.01 -0.05 (0.01)*** -4.42 -0.07 - -0.03
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.004)** 2.53 0.002 - 0.02 -0.02 (0.03) -0.69 -0.08 - 0.04 0.02 (0.02) 1.00 -0.02 - 0.06
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)  － 0.995  － 0.999  － 0.976
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)  － 0.977  － 0.996  － 0.934
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)  － 0.043  － 0.016  － 0.063
 * p  < .05.     ** p  < .01. *** p < .001.
Predictive Factors as Mediators Between Residency and Voting Choice in (A) Memory Consistency, (B) Memory Confidence and (C) Memory Vividness 
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Supplemental Materials  
Details of Coding 
What time was it when you found out the results? For the question “what time was 
it when you found out the results?” we coded the data in two ways. The first method of coding, 
the “specific or average” coding column recorded the participant’s response into a 24-hour 
format e.g. if the response was “7:30am”, then it would be coded as “07:30”. The second 
method, the “specific or approximate” coding, translated time entries (numerical or 
descriptive) that either reflected very precise times (e.g. “7:22am”) or more vague times (e.g. 
“In the morning”) into a time category. Since not all responses were written in a time format 
and often included more descriptive responses such as "Morning", we used the data from this 
method of coding to create the memory consistency score.   
How did you learn the outcome? For the question “how did you learn the outcome?” 
participants were given pre-defined options to choose from (e.g. television, internet, friends 
and family, newspaper, radio and other). The pre-defined options were then translated into 
coding categories (e.g. 0-6) which were then compared across time points.  
Where were you when you found out the results?  For the question “where were you 
when you found out the results?” we coded the data in three separate ways to record the 
geographic locations of participants. The first method of coding recorded the actual site i.e. if 
they were at home, at work or school, or if they were commuting etc. For example, if the 
participant responded “I was at home watching TV”, it would have been recorded as ‘home’. 
The second method of coding recorded participant’s ‘geographic site’ e.g. if they responded - 
“In London, UK,” while the third method of coding recorded the room location e.g. “I was in 
my bedroom”. Since most responses did not include highly specific and/or detailed locations 
mentioning geographic locations and/or specific rooms, we used the ‘actual site’ coded data 
for our memory consistency score. 
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Who else was there when you found out? For the question “who else was there 
when you found out the results?” we coded each person category (e.g. ‘spouse/lover’, ‘parent’, 
‘child’ etc.) as “1” if they were mentioned or “0” if they were not mentioned.   
What were you doing beforehand? For the question “what were you doing 
beforehand?” we converted each response into a behavior category (e.g. ‘awaking’, ‘preparing 
for the day’, ‘commuting’, ‘leisure activities’ etc.).  
What did you do immediately after finding out the results? For the question “what 
did you do immediately after finding out the results?” we used our primary coding score to 
code the initial behavior stated rather than our secondary and additional coding scores which 
reflected secondary and additional behaviors. Like the previous question, we converted each 
response into a behavior category (e.g. ‘emoted’, ‘followed the news, ‘communicated’, 
‘preparing for the day’ etc.) and then compared these across time points.  
Supplemental Results 
 
Differences in Demographic Characteristics across the Three Groups  
 In order to examine whether there were any group differences on measures of age, sex 
and level of education, three separate one-way ANOVAs were carried out for each time point 
using RStudio (v. 1.1.463) and the stats (v. 3.6.2) package (R Core Team, 2019).  
 Age. The age of participants was significantly different between groups at each survey 
(ps < .005). Post-hoc analysis using Bonferroni multiple comparison test revealed that across 
all surveys, US participants were significantly younger than Leave participants, p = .004 p 
<.001; p <.001; p <.001 (Surveys 1-4 respectively). There were no significant differences 
between Leave and Remain participants (ps > .05) or between US and Remain participants (ps 
>.05).  
Gender. The gender distribution for each group across Surveys 1, 2 and 3 was 
significantly different (ps <.05). In Surveys 1, 2 and 3, the Remain group had significantly 
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more female participants: z = 3.20, p = .008; z = 3.50, p = .003 and z = 3.53, p = .002 (Surveys 
1-3 respectively) whereas US participants had significantly more males, z = 4.46, p < .001; z = 
4.17, p < .001 and z = 2.68, p =.045 (Surveys 1-3 respectively).  
Education. The level of education among participants was significantly different 
between groups at Survey 1, 3 and 4 (ps <.001) but not Survey 2.6 Post-hoc analysis using 
Bonferroni’s multiple comparison test revealed that at Surveys 1, 3 and 4, Remain participants 
had significantly higher levels of education compared to both Leave and US participants (ps < 
.001). In addition, at Survey 3, US participants had higher levels of education than Leave 
participants, p =.017.  
Effects of Residency and Voting Choice on Memory  
Since our groups differed significantly on measures of age, education level and 
gender, we re-ran the SEM models (see S-Table 2) to ensure that our results were not being 
driven by group differences in these measures.  
Memory consistency. The analysis on memory consistency supported our initial 
findings in that UK participants had a higher memory consistency score for Survey 2, β = -
.05, t = -6.79, p <.001, even after controlling for gender, age and education, β = -.05, t = -
6.16, p <.001 (S-Table 2A). Likewise, Leave and Remain participants did not significantly 
differ in their initial memory consistency level at Survey 2 (p = .69), but significantly differed 
in the slope, β = .01, t = 1.99, p = .046, suggesting that once again, Leave participants 
exhibited a quicker rate of decline in memory consistency. These results support our initial 
findings even after controlling for age, gender and education level. However, one difference 
between the current results and our initial findings is that after controlling for age, gender and 
                                                 
6 Due to a technical error in Survey 2, we do not have education level information for 67% Leave participants, 
79% for Remain participants and 77% for US participants. This could therefore explain the non-significant 
findings. 
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education, we no longer find a significant difference in the slope between UK and US 
residents.  
Memory confidence. A similar analysis on memory confidence (S-Table 2B) also 
confirmed our previous findings. Once again, initial confidence levels at Survey 2 (as 
reflected by the intercepts) were higher for UK participants compared to US participants, β = 
-.47, t = -10.13, p < .001. Furthermore, there were no significant differences between the US 
and UK participants in their slopes (p = .46) but there was a significant effect of voting 
choice, β = -.05, t = -3.34, p = .001, suggesting that Remain participants exhibited a quicker 
rate of decline in memory confidence compared to Leave participants. In addition, the two 
voting groups were not significantly different in the initial levels of confidence (p =.05). Like 
memory consistency, these results for memory confidence offer further support to our initial 
findings, even after controlling for age, gender and education. 
Memory vividness. A similar analysis on memory vividness (S-Table 2C) partially 
confirmed our initial results. Like before, the results revealed that UK participants, compared 
to US participants, had higher intercepts for their memory vividness, β = -.50, t = -12.36, p < 
.001, with a smaller decline over time, β = -.03, t = -3.84, p < .001. We also confirmed that 
Leave and Remain participants exhibited a similar level of decline over time (p = .60). 
However, unlike our previous findings, after controlling for age, gender and education level, 
we no longer found a significant difference in the intercept for memory vividness between 
Leave and Remain participants, β = .07, t = 1.29, p = .20. Thus, it seems that after controlling 
for age, gender and education level, Remain and Leave voters recall memories that are 
equally as vivid, both initially and across a period of 16 months.  
Mediation Analysis Including Age, Education and Gender as Covariates 
We also re-ran the mediation models while including these demographic variables as 
covariates (see S-Table 3).  Across all three mediation models, after controlling for age, 
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education level and gender, we replicated our initial findings for memory consistency (S-
Table 3A), memory confidence (S-Table 3B) and memory vividness (S-Table 3C), 
suggesting that the effects of group were not being driven by the significant differences in the 
demographic variables.  
Recoded Memory Consistency  
A second memory consistency score was obtained, this time using a combination of 
the Hirst et al. (2009) and the Neisser and Harsch (1992) coding scheme. Here, we focused 
on responses that had originally received a “0” for the initial consistency score but this time 
allowed memories that were less specific and/or with more/less detail than previously 
documented, to be considered consistent. In other words, if the responses were initially 
deemed inconsistent but matched the gist of the initial memory, with more or less detail than 
before, they were now assigned a “1” to reflect consistency. On the other hand, if they were 
completely different, absent or did not answer the question, the response received a “0”.  
Responses that were initially consistent maintained a “1”. Thus, a secondary consistency 
score, more similar to that of Neisser and Harsch (1992), was created. Similar to the memory 
consistency score reported in the main text, the recoded memory consistency score was the 
averaged memory consistency of the 6 recoded questions (Table 2, Questions 2-7) and ranged 
from 0 to 1.  
Another SEM model was carried out with the recoded memory consistency score as 
the dependent variable (see S-Table 4). Once again, effect coding was used to create two 
group variables; one to compare UK participants (Leave and Remain voters) with US 
participants (referred to as UK vs US in the model) and the second to compare Remain voters 
with Leave voters (referred to as R vs L in the model). The analysis revealed that, like before, 
UK participants had a higher memory consistency score for Survey 2, β = -.04, t = -6.38, p 
<.001, but this time, did not have a steeper decline when compared to US participants, p = 
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.097 (S-Table 4). More importantly, we again found that while Leave and Remain voters 
were not significantly different in their initial memory consistency level at Survey 2 (p = .25), 
they did significantly differ in the slope; Leave participants exhibited a quicker rate of 
decline in memory consistency, β = .01, t = 2.61, p = .009 (see S-Table 4). These results 
suggest that the effects of valence we found in our main analyses are not due to the way we 
coded our memory data.  
Memory for Emotional Reactions 
Since previous research has suggested that memories for emotional responses tend to 
be less accurate than memories for other aspects (Hirst et al., 2009), we also asked 
participants about their memory of their emotional reactions (emotional intensity and 
surprise) from when they found the results of the referendum (S-Table 5 Questions 1a-1f; 
angry, sad, anxious, happy, proud and surprise all with 7-point Likert scales). We created two 
measures of emotion for each time point; one to reflect memory of negative emotion and 
another to reflect memory of positive emotion and separately used measures of surprise. 
We then explored the effects of voting choice and residency on memory for initial 
emotional reactions; thus three SEM analyses (similar to the one used for current levels of 
positive and negative emotion) were performed separately on participants’ memory for how 
negatively or positively they felt and how surprised they felt after learning the referendum 
results.  
As is evident in S-Tables 7A-B, Remain participants had higher intercepts for 
memory of negative emotion compared to Leave participants, β = 1.84, t = 37.61, p < .001 
but lower intercepts for memory of positive emotion, β = -2.04, t = 37.01, p < .001. UK 
participants, compared to US participants, had higher intercepts of both negative emotion, β = 
-0.34, t = -9.96, p < .001 and positive emotion, β = -0.38, t = -10.75, p < .001. While all 
groups seemed to forget their initial levels of positive and negative emotion over time, there 
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were no significant differences in the how quickly they forgot negative (UK vs US, p = .25; 
Leave vs Remain, p = .17) or positive emotion (UK vs US, p = .57; Leave vs Remain, p = 
.62). Together, these results suggest that memory for the intensity of positive and negative 
affect, at the time of learning the referendum results, was forgotten at a similar rate for all 
participants, irrespective of voting choice or residency.  
As for participants’ memory for how surprised they were, UK and US participants 
recalled feeling just as surprised (p = .086) but Remain participants recalled feeling more 
surprised than Leave voters, β= .21, t = 2.97, p = .003 (see S-Table 7C). Unlike the results for 
memory of negative and positive emotion where all groups showed a similar rate of decline 
over time, the results for memory of surprise suggests that US participants forgot their initial 
levels of surprise more quickly over time compared to UK participants, β= -.02, t = -2.51, p = 
.012. However, there were no differences in the rate of change over time between the two UK 
voting groups (p = .87) suggesting that they forgot their initial levels of surprise at a similar 
rate.  
Previous research has argued that emotional reactions are forgotten more quickly than 
levels of consistency, confidence and vividness (Hirst et al., 2009, 2015). Past research has 
also shown that memories for emotional reactions can be influenced by our current emotional 
state (Levine et al., 2001, 2005) and that post-event information can encourage us to under- 
or over-estimate our past emotions (Safer et al., 2002). Consistent with these prior findings, 
we found that participants’ memory for their initial reaction of surprise declined over time for 
all groups of participants but especially for US participants. These findings fit with the idea 
that individuals use their current emotional states when remembering past emotional 
experiences (Levine & Safer, 2002). In other words, they are more likely to recall past 
emotions that are more consistent with their current feelings. In contrast, we did not find a 
significant effect of time for how negative or positive participants originally felt, indicating 
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that all groups forgot their initial emotional reactions at a similar rate over time. Interestingly, 
when we analyzed their current levels of negative and positive emotion, these emotions 
declined with time suggesting that memory for them does not seem to be biased by current 
feelings. Although this finding is contrary to previous research which has found that past 
emotions are often over- or under-estimated depending on the current appraisal of the event 
(Levine et al., 2001; Safer et al., 2002) or that they are forgotten more quickly than other 
features of a flashbulb memory (Hirst et al., 2009), it could be that we have not yet seen 
evidence of this bias and/or effect within our timeframe of 16 months, especially as there was 
also no official outcome of the referendum vote within this time. Once again, these results 
may be specific to this particular event and as such, future research should further investigate 
the consistency of memory for past emotional reactions.  
Perception of change to life 
In Surveys 2 we asked “Since the referendum results, has your life got better, got 
worse or stayed the same?” and participants were asked to choose one of the three options 
(a) “got better”, (b) “got worse” or (c) “stayed the same”. A chi-square test of independence 
was performed to examine the relationship between group (Remain vs. Leave participants) 
and the perception of change to life (changed: better or worse vs. stayed the same)7. We 
found that the two groups significantly differed in their perception of change to their lives 
since the referendum results, χ2 (1) = 11.09, p < .001. In Survey 2, 21% of Remain 
participants said that their life had changed (got better or worse) compared to only 8% of 
Leave participants. These results suggest that participants may have differed in their 
perception of how much the EU referendum results changed their lives.  
 
                                                 
7 The cell sizes for “got better” and “got worse” were smaller than 5, therefore we combined these two 
measures into one variable to represent “change”.  
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Correlations of predictive factors in Survey 1
1 2 3 4 5
1. Rehearsal -
2. Personal Importance 0.67*** -
3. Positive Emotion  0.03 0.20*** -
4. Negative Emotion 0.47***  0.44*** -0.47*** -
5. Surprise 0.22***  0.21*** 0.14** 0.21*** -







b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI
0.56 (0.06)*** 9.76 0.45 - 0.67 5.38 (0.36)*** 15.02 4.68 - 6.08 5.55 (0.29)*** 19.41 4.99 - 6.11
US vs UK -0.05 (0.01)*** -6.16 -0.06 - -0.03 -0.47 (0.05)*** -10.13 -0.57 - -0.38 -0.5 (0.04)*** -12.36 -0.58 - -0.42
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.01) 0.39 -0.02 - 0.03 0.14 (0.07)* 1.96 0.00 - 0.28 0.07 (0.05) 1.29 -0.04 - 0.18
Age 0.002 (0.01) 0.26 -0.01 - 0.02 0.01 (0.004) 1.83 -0.001 - 0.02 0.002 (0.003) 0.63 -0.004 - 0.01
Education 0.01 (0.01) 0.87 -0.01 - 0.03 -0.03 (0.07) -0.38 -0.16 - 0.11 0.08 (0.06) 1.44 -0.03 - 0.19
Gender 0.03 (0.02) 1.26 -0.02 - 0.07 -0.08 (0.14) -0.55 -0.36 - 0.20 -0.07 (0.11) -0.62 -0.28 - 0.15
0.002 (0.01) 0.15 -0.02 - 0.03 -0.32 (0.08)*** -3.89 -0.48 - -0.16 -0.22 (0.08)** -2.89 -0.37 - -0.07
US vs UK 0.003 (0.002) 1.83 0.00 - 0.01 0.01 (0.01) 0.74 -0.01 - 0.03 -0.03 (0.01)*** -3.84 -0.05 - -0.02
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.003)* 2.00 0.00 - 0.01 -0.05 (0.02)*** -3.34 -0.08 - -0.02 -0.01 (0.01) -0.53 -0.04 - 0.02
Age -0.002 (0.001) -1.29 -0.01 - 0.001 0.00 (0.001) 0.41 -0.001 - 0.002 0.001 (0.001) 1.18 -0.001 - 0.003
Education 0.001 (0.002) 0.42 -0.003 - 0.01 0.05 (0.02)** 3.07 0.02 - 0.08 0.01 (0.01) 1.00 -0.01 - 0.04
Gender 0.00 (0.004) -0.11 -0.01 - 0.01 0.03 (0.03) 0.84 -0.04 - 0.09 -0.01 (0.03) -0.34 -0.06 - 0.04
-0.41 (0.18) -2.29 -0.76 - -0.06 -0.27 (0.24) -1.14 -0.73 - 0.19 0.27 (0.32) 0.90 -0.30 - 0.87
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.946  － 0.975  － 0.937
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.853  － 0.934  － 0.890
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.066  － 0.050  － 0.072
 * p  < .05.    ** p  < .01.    *** p  < .001.
Correlations
Intercept ~~ Slope
Growth Curve Models of (A) Memory Consistency, (B) Memory Confidence and (C) Memory Vividness After Controlling for Age, Education and Gender.
A. Memory Consistency B. Memory Confidence	 C. Memory Vividness	
Intercept 
Slope
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b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI b  (SE) t-value 95% CI
Importance predicted by:
US vs UK -0.74 (0.04)*** -17.34 -0.82 - -0.65 -0.73 (0.04)*** -17.66 -0.81 - -0.65 -0.73 (0.04)*** -17.69 -0.82 - -0.65
Remain vs Leave 0.22 (0.07)*** 3.25 0.09 - 0.35 0.22 (0.07)*** 3.29 0.09 - 0.35 0.20 (0.07)** 3.08 0.07 - 0.33
Age 0.08 (0.04)* 2.36 0.01 - 0.15 0.01 (0.003)* 2.33 0.001 - 0.02 0.01 (0.04)* 2.37 0.01 - 0.15
Education 0.16 (0.06)** 2.89 0.05 - 0.27 0.16 (0.06)** 2.84 0.05 - 0.26 0.16 (0.06)** 2.88 0.05 - 0.27
Gender 0.07 (0.11) 0.65 -0.15 - 0.30 0.08 (0.11) 0.66 -0.15 - 0.30 0.08 (0.11) 0.66 -0.15 - 0.30
Negative emotion predicted by:
US vs UK -0.36 (0.04)*** -8.18 -0.45 - -0.27 -0.36 (0.04)*** -8.24 -0.45 - -0.27 -0.36 (0.04)*** -8.20 -0.45 - -0.27
Remain vs Leave 1.37 (0.08)*** 17.28 1.22 - 1.53 1.37 (0.08)*** 17.24 1.21 - 1.52 1.36 (0.08)*** 17.06 1.21 - 1.52
Age -0.08 (0.04)* -2.03 -0.15 - -0.003 -0.01 (0.004)* -2.05 -0.02 - 0.00 -0.01 (0.04)* -2.03 -0.15 - -0.003
Education 0.18 (0.06)** 2.93 0.06 - 0.31 0.18 (0.06)** 2.92 0.06 - 0.31 0.18 (0.06)** 2.92 0.06 - 0.31
Gender 0.35 (0.13)** 2.78 0.10 - 0.60 0.35 (0.13)** 2.79 0.10 - 0.60 0.35 (0.13)** 2.79 0.11 - 0.60
Positive emotion predicted by:
US vs UK -0.30 (0.05)*** -6.29 -0.40 - -0.21 -0.30 (0.05)*** -6.37 -0.39 - -0.21 -0.30 (0.05)*** -6.36 -0.40 - -0.21
Remain vs Leave -1.67 (0.09)*** -19.19 -1.85 - -1.50 -1.68 (0.09)*** -19.50 -1.85 - -1.51 -1.69 (0.09)*** -19.52 -1.86 - -1.52
Age 0.13 (0.04)** 3.01 0.04 - 0.21 0.01 (0.004)** 2.99 0.004 - 0.02 0.01 (0.04)** 3.02 0.04 - 0.21
Education -0.12 (0.06)* -1.95 -0.23 - 0.00 -0.12 (0.06)* -1.98 -0.23 - -0.001 -0.12 (0.06)* -1.95 -0.23 - 0.001
Gender -0.18 (0.13) -1.41 -0.43 - 0.07 -0.18 (0.13) -1.40 -0.43 - 0.07 -0.18 (0.13) -1.40 -0.43 - 0.07
Rehearsal predicted by:
US vs UK -0.42 (0.03)*** -13.68 -0.48 - -0.36 -0.42 (0.03)*** -13.88 -0.47 - -0.36 -0.42 (0.03)*** -14.13 -0.48 - -0.36
Remain vs Leave 0.27 (0.06)*** 4.66 0.16 - 0.39 0.27 (0.06)*** 4.68 0.16 - 0.38 0.26 (0.06)*** 4.43 0.14 - 0.37
Age 0.05 (0.03) 1.83 -0.004 - 0.11 0.01 (0.003) 1.79 0.00 - 0.01 0.01 (0.03) 1.84 -0.003 - 0.11
Education 0.19 (0.04)*** 4.60 0.11 - 0.27 0.19 (0.04)*** 4.56 0.11 - 0.27 0.19 (0.04)*** 4.66 0.11 - 0.27
Gender -0.11 (0.09) -1.28 -0.28 - 0.06 -0.11 (0.09) -1.29 -0.28 - 0.06 -0.11 (0.09) -1.27 -0.27 - 0.06
Surprise predicted by:
US vs UK -0.12 (0.05)* -2.19 -0.23 - -0.01 -0.12 (0.05)* -2.18 -0.22 - -0.01 -0.12 (0.05)* -2.20 -0.22 - -0.01
Remain vs Leave -0.09 (0.10) -0.86 -0.29 - 0.11 -0.09 (0.10) -0.87 -0.29 - 0.11 -0.10 (0.10) -0.96 -0.30 - 0.10
Age 0.11 (0.05)* 2.09 0.01 - 0.20 0.01 (0.01)* 2.07 0.001 - 0.02 0.01 (0.01)* 2.09 0.01 - 0.20
Education -0.08 (0.08) -1.06 -0.23 - 0.07 -0.08 (0.08) -1.09 -0.23 - 0.07 -0.08 (0.08) -1.07 -0.23 - 0.07
Gender 0.11 (0.16) 0.72 -0.19 - 0.42 0.11 (0.16) 0.73 -0.19 - 0.42 0.11 (0.16) 0.73 -0.19 - 0.42
Intercept predicted by:
Importance 0.01 (0.01) 0.96 -0.01 - 0.03 0.25 (0.06)*** 3.89 0.12 - 0.38 0.20 (0.06)*** 3.60 0.09 - 0.30
Positive Emotion -0.02 (0.01)* -2.31 -0.04 - -0.003 0.04 (0.05) 0.86 -0.06 - 0.15 0.09 (0.04)* 2.11 0.01 - 0.16
Negative Emotion 0.002 (0.01) 0.23 -0.01 - 0.02 -0.03 (0.06) -0.60 -0.14 - 0.08 0.05 (0.04) 1.31 -0.03 - 0.13
Rehearsal -0.01 (0.01) -0.74 -0.03 - 0.01 0.29 (0.08)*** 3.67 0.14 - 0.45 0.37 (0.05)*** 7.53 0.28 - 0.47
Surprise 0.001 (0.01) 0.10 -0.01 - 0.01 0.04 (0.04) 1.11 -0.03 - 0.11 0.05 (0.03) 1.90 -0.001 - 0.10
Age 0.003 (0.01) 0.52 -0.01 - 0.02 0.003 (0.004) 0.81 -0.01 - 0.01 -0.003 (0.003) -0.92 -0.08 - 0.03
Gender 0.02 (0.02) 1.02 -0.02 - 0.06 -0.05 (0.14) -0.35 -0.32 - 0.23 -0.05 (0.09) -0.53 -0.23 - 0.13
Education 0.01 (0.01) 0.56 -0.02 - 0.03 -0.10 (0.07) -1.56 -0.23 - 0.03 -0.02 (0.05) -0.33 -0.12 - 0.08
US vs UK -0.05 (0.01)*** -4.86 -0.07 - -0.03 -0.17 (0.06)** -2.58 -0.29 - -0.04 -0.15 (0.05)** -3.01 -0.24 - -0.05
Remain vs Leave -0.03 (0.02) -1.44 -0.07 - 0.01 0.13 (0.12) 1.10 -0.10 - 0.36 0.01 (0.09) 0.10 -0.16 - 0.18
Slope predicted by:
Importance -0.004 (0.002) -1.81 -0.01 - 0.00 -0.03 (0.02) -1.61 -0.06 - 0.01 -0.03 (0.01)* -2.30 -0.05 - -0.004
Positive Emotion 0.001 (0.002) 0.78 -0.002 - 0.004 0.02 (0.01) 1.27 -0.01 - 0.04 0.01 (0.01) 0.90 -0.01 - 0.03
Negative Emotion -0.003 (0.002) -1.45 -0.01 - 0.001 0.02 (0.01) 1.07 -0.01 - 0.04 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 -0.02 - 0.02
Rehearsal 0.01 (0.002)* 2.19 0.001 - 0.01 -0.03 (0.02) -1.25 -0.07 - 0.02 0.004 (0.01) 0.27 -0.02 - 0.03
Surprise 0.00 (0.001) 0.26 -0.002 - 0.003 -0.004 (0.01) -0.43 -0.02 - 0.02 -0.004 (0.01) -0.52 -0.02 - 0.01
Age -0.002 (0.001) -1.45 -0.01 - 0.001 0.001 (0.001) 0.60 -0.001 - 0.002 0.001 (0.001) 1.20 -0.01 - 0.03
Gender 0.001 (0.004) 0.32 -0.01 - 0.01 0.02 (0.03) 0.68 -0.04 - 0.09 -0.01 (0.03) -0.23 -0.06 - 0.05
Education 0.001 (0.002) 0.64 -0.003 - 0.01 0.05 (0.02)*** 3.39 0.02 - 0.08 0.02 (0.01) 1.33 -0.01 - 0.05
US vs UK 0.002 (0.002) 0.89 -0.002 - 0.01 -0.01 (0.01) -0.98 -0.04 - 0.01 -0.05 (0.01)*** -4.34 -0.07 - -0.03
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.004)** 2.57 0.002 - 0.02 -0.03 (0.03) -1.13 -0.09 - 0.02 0.01 (0.02) 0.64 -0.03 - 0.06
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.986  － 0.991  － 0.973
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.932  － 0.955  － 0.974
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 0.059  － 0.042  － 0.058
 * p  < .05.     ** p  < .01.  *** p < .001.
Predictive Factors as Mediators Between Residency and Voting Choice in (A) Memory Consistency, (B) Memory Confidence and (C) Memory Vividness After 
Controlling for Age, Education and Gender.
A. Memory Consistency B. Memory Confidence C. Memory Vividness
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b (SE) t-value 95% CI
0.70 (0.01)*** 74.07 3.30 - 4.80
US vs UK -0.04 (0.01)*** -6.38 -0.48 - -0.26
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.01) 1.15 -0.04 - 0.16
-0.003 (0.002) -1.40 -0.27 - 0.05
US vs UK 0.003 (0.002) 1.66 0.03 - 0.32
Remain vs Leave 0.01 (0.002)** 2.61 0.03 - 0.35
-0.49 (0.12)*** -4.07 -0.73 - -0.25
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.997
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.991
0.024
 * p  < .05.    ** p  < .01.    *** p < .001.
Intercept ~~ Slope
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 













Emotional Memory Questions that are relevant to the current analyses
How strongly did you feel the following emotions when you 
found out the results? (1. Not at all to 7. Very strongly) 
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Memory assessments and survey M (SD) n M (SD) n M (SD) n
Memory for Negative Emotion
Survey 1 5.61 (1.23) 190 2.05 (1.15) 153 2.80 (1.58) 217
Survey 2 5.58 (1.18) 226 1.93 (1.09) 214 2.63 (1.48) 238
Survey 3 5.57 (1.25) 222 1.92 (1.1) 212 2.72 (1.64) 228
Survey 4 5.43 (1.3) 176 1.85 (0.96) 174 2.59 (1.59) 163
Memory for Positive Emotion
Survey 1 1.18 (0.59) 190 5.14 (1.76) 153 2.26 (1.69) 217
Survey 2 1.29 (0.66) 226 5.31 (1.69) 214 2.10 (1.55) 238
Survey 3 1.31 (0.69) 222 5.51 (1.63) 212 2.12 (1.61) 228
Survey 4 1.28 (0.62) 176 5.38 (1.56) 174 2.02 (1.60) 163
Memory for Surprise
Survey 1 5.57 (1.57) 190 5.33 (1.7) 153 5.35 (1.52) 217
Survey 2 5.78 (1.39) 226 5.23 (1.83) 214 5.20 (1.65) 238
Survey 3 5.65 (1.44) 222 5.29 (1.64) 212 5.12 (1.76) 228
Survey 4 5.68 (1.38) 176 5.31 (1.63) 174 4.98 (1.84) 163
S Table 6
Memory of Negative Emotion and Memory of Surprise as a Function of Voting Group and 
Residency, Across All Surveys 
Remain Leave US















b (SE) t-value 95% CI b (SE) t-value 95% CI b (SE) t-value 95% CI
Intercept 1.25 (0.09)*** 77.55 3.35 - 3.53 2.92 (0.05)*** 60.84 2.83 - 3.02 5.43 (0.06)*** 97.60 5.32 - 5.54
US vs UK -0.34 (0.03)*** -9.96 -0.41 - -0.27 -0.38 (0.04)*** -10.75 -0.46 - -0.31 -0.07 (0.04) -1.71 -0.14 - 0.01
Remain vs Leave 1.84 (0.05)*** 37.61 1.74 - 1.93 -2.04 (0.06)*** -37.01 -2.15 - -1.93 0.21 (0.07)** 2.97 0.07 - 0.34
Slope -0.02 (0.01)* -2.13 -0.03 - -0.001 -0.01 (0.01) -0.90 -0.02 - 0.01 -0.03 (0.01)** -2.71 -0.05 - -0.01
US vs UK -0.01 (0.01) -1.16 -0.02 - 0.01 -0.003 (0.01) -0.56 -0.01 - 0.01 -0.02 (0.01)* -2.51 -0.03 - -0.004
Remain vs Leave -0.01 (0.01) -1.37 -0.03 - 0.004 0.004 (0.01) 0.50 -0.01 - 0.02 -0.002 (0.01) -0.16 -0.02 - 0.02
Correlation
Intercept ~~ Slope -0.14 (0.10) -1.50 -0.33 - 0.04 -0.17 - 0.13 -1.28 -0.43 - 0.09 -.04 (0.13) 0.76 -0.29 - 0.22
Model Fit Indices 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)  － 0.998  － 0.999  － 0.982
Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)  － 0.998  － 0.999  － 0.978
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)  － 0.023  － 0.017  － 0.044
 * p  < .05.      ** p < .01.     *** p < .001.
Growth Curve Models of (A) Memory of Negative Emotion and (B) Memory of Surprise
A. Memory of Negative Emotion C. Memory of SurpriseB. Memory of Positive Emotion
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